Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors

By David Yermack. 2002

848 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/29689b62dad116b5c85cef7c2920d9595ecbf685

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Citations in the corpus

Busy Directors and Firm Performance: Evidence from Mergers (2018, neutral): “Yermack (2004) finds that most newly appointed outside directors join the board with limited knowledge of the company’s operations or the issues it faces, and gain it within the first few years on the board.”
What Do Independent Directors Know? Evidence from Their Trading (2010, positive): “Yermack (2004) documents that 77% of the directors in his sample receive either stock or options awards, and Perry (2000) shows that the trend toward equity-based compensation for directors has been increasing over time.”
The Stigmatization and Devaluation of Elites Associated with Corporate Failures: A Process Model (2008, positive): “Empirical evidence indicates that stigmatized elites tend to pay a price in future wages, in both the managerial and director la bor markets (Cannella et al., 1995; Gilson, 1989; Yermack, 2004).”
Does the impact of board independence on large bank risks change after the global financial crisis (2017, positive): “Independent directors aim to maintain a good reputation in the directorship market as this will help gain additional board seats in the labor market going forward (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Ferris et al., 2004; Jagannathan et al., 2015; Yermack, 2004).”
The relation between board size and firm performance in firms with a history of poor operating performance (2010, neutral): “Yermack (2004) also uses proxy statement dates to assess the market reaction to perquisite disclosures.”
Female board directorship and firm performance: What really matters? (2018, neutral): “…their career opportunities Diamond, 1989 ) by questioning takeover defenses ( Coles and oi, 2003 ), firing underperforming CEOs ( Farrell and Whidee, 20 0 0 ), dissenting during votes on questionable decisions Jiang et al., 2016 ), and, more generally, enhancing firm perfor- ance ( Yermack, 2004 ).”
Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors (2006, neutral): “Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), Farrell and Whidbee (2000), and Yermack (2004) find that outside directors are more likely to leave the board when a new CEO is appointed.”
Board Compensation Practices and Agency Costs of Debt (2008, positive): “Following Anderson et al. (2003) and Ortiz-Molina (2006), we also control for firm characteristics.”
Committee Independence and Financial Institution Performance During the 2007–08 Credit Crunch: Evidence from a Multi‐Country Study (2011, neutral): “An independent director in financial institutions can therefore be induced by reputation incentives to be constrained from excessive risk-taking behaviors in order to improve governance mechanisms and performance (Adams & Ferreira, 2008; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Yermack, 2004).”
Board classification and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from the market for corporate control (2008, neutral): “Furthermore, evidence in Harford (2003) and Yermack (2004) suggests that external incentives could be sufficient to mitigate managerial self-dealing and encourage directors (particularly unaffiliated directors) to proactively represent the interests of target shareholder during a change-in-control…”
Reputation concerns of independent directors: : Evidence from individual director voting (2015, neutral): “One caution to this measure is that too many directorships can be related to leniency by directors (Yermack (2004), Fich and Shivdasani (2006)).”