The Match between CEO and Firm

By Sam Allgood, K. Farrell. 2003

158 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Public Administration

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/32660915bb2757ad34ef922ded1273423f2a77c6

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Mary Ellen Carter
2. İ. Tuna
3. Holger M. Mueller
4. Roman Inderst
5. Luann J. Lynch
6. Jeong‐Bon Kim
7. Liandong Zhang
8. Yinghua Li

In Economics and Econometrics

1. İ. Tuna
2. Holger M. Mueller
3. Roman Inderst
4. Luann J. Lynch
5. Dragana Cvijanovic
6. Jiuh‐Biing Sheu

Citations in the corpus

• The Role of Accounting in the Design of CEO Equity Compensation (2007, background): “Individuals in the same position longer likely feel more stable and secure and therefore are likely to be less risk averse since the likelihood of CEO turnover decreases with tenure (Sebora, 1996; Farber, 1999; Allgood and Farrell, 2000; Allgood and Farrell, 2003).”
• CEO Replacement under Private Information (2010, background): “Empirical support for the hypothesis that the match quality affects CEO replacement is provided by Allgood and Farrell (2003).”
• CEO Turnover in a Competitive Assignment Framework (2013, unknown): “This evidence is also consistent with the finding documented by Allgood and Farrell (2003) that longer-lasting firm-CEO matches tend to occur when inside CEOs follow previous CEOs who quit, and when outside CEOs follow previous CEOs who are dismissed. To see whether these univariate results are robu”
• CEO Reputation and Earnings Quality (2008, unknown): “The selection criteria used by boards encompass many factors, including the existing reputation of the CEO and firm-specific factors (see, for example, Bizjak, Brickley and Coles [1993], Hermalin and Weisbach [1998], Allgood and Farrell [2003], and Joos, Leone and Zimmerman [2003]).”