A theory of school‐choice lotteries
By Onur Kesten, M. Utku Ünver. 2015
99 citations recorded by the source corpus.
A new centralized mechanism was introduced in New York City and Boston to assign students to public schools in district school-choice programs. This mechanism was advocated for its superior fairness property, besides others, over the mechanisms it replaced. In this paper, we introduce a new framework for investigating school-choice matching problems and two ex-ante notions of fairness in lottery design, strong ex-ante stability and ex-ante stability. This frame- work generalizes known one-to-many two-sided and one-sided matching models. We first show that the new NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new mechanisms, the fractional deferred-acceptance mechanism, which is ordinally Pareto dominant within the class of strongly ex-ante stable mechanisms, and the fractional deferred- acceptance and trading mechanism, which satisfies equal treatment of equals and constrained ordinal Pareto efficiency within the class of ex-ante stable mechanisms.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/625cd81c29c8e8a1cb23153bad860d49987190ff
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Citations in the corpus
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism (2014, background): “In practice, determining these orders often involves randomization (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003; Erdil and Ergin, 2008; Kesten and Ünver, 2010; Pathak and Sethuraman, 2011).”