Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism: Strategy-proofness as Equal Access

By Atila Abdulkadiroùglu, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez. 2006

316 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Education, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b3cfa5c924fa0c09146b366b4a9a614bc0a2b328

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Citations in the corpus

The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (2010, background): “, (2)) she gets none of the courses she bid on.”
Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston's Charters And Pilots (2009, background): “Thus, there is considerable heterogeneity in the pilot middle school math effects: grade 6-to-8 schools appear to be weaker than K-8 schools, at least as (17)The sample analog of equation (4) can be thought of as a strategy that combines Wald estimates based on Zi across risk sets.”
Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences (2013, background): “Example applications include assigning junior doctors to hospitals [596,602–604], pupils to schools [1,2,4] and schoolleavers to universities [64, 77, 111, 491].”
What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice (2008, background): “For a complete description, see Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2006) or “Introducing the Boston Public Schools 2007: A Guide for Parents and Students,” available at http://www.boston.k2.ma.us/schools/assign.asp (accessed September 2, 2007).”
Unbalanced Random Matching Markets: The Stark Effect of Competition (2017, unknown): “Stable matching models have been successfully adopted in market design contexts such as school choice (Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, and Roth 2005; Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2006) and resident matching programs (Roth and Peranson 1999).”
An analysis of the German university admissions system (2013, methodology): “2Most public schools in Boston have to admit any student with an older sibling already attending the school (see Abdulkadiroglu et al 2006), while some public schools in New York City have to admit all students whose performance in a standardized English language exam is among the top 2 percent (see”
Preferences and Heterogeneous Treatment Effects in a Public School Choice Lottery (2006, unknown): “However, students with a strong preference for proximity or racial climate may actually experience losses in academic achievement.”
A theory of school‐choice lotteries (2015, methodology): “We ran simulations to estimate the performance of the FDAT mechanism and contrast it with those of the NYC/Boston, deferred acceptance algorithm with a single tie-breaking lottery (DA henceforth) and Erdil and Ergin (2008) (EE henceforth) mechanisms in problems that approximately match the main char”