School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation. NBER Working Paper No. 16783.

By Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez. 2011

220 citations recorded by the source corpus.

In Fall 2009, Chicago authorities abandoned a school assignment mechanism midstream, citing concerns about its vulnerability to manipulation. Nonetheless, they asked thousands of applicants to re-rank schools in a new mechanism that is also manipulable. This paper introduces a method to compare mechanisms by their vulnerability to manipulation. Our methodology formalizes how the old mechanism is at least as manipulable as any other plausible mechanism, including the new one. A number of similar transitions took place in England after the widely popular Boston mechanism was ruled illegal in 2007. Our approach provides support for these and other recent policy changes. (JEL C78, D82, H75, I21, I28)

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9af46394326f87ecd7e8579e95bab37105f8ed51

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Citations in the corpus

Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy (2013, background): “(See Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003), Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, Roth, and Sönmez (2005), Kesten (2010), Pathak and Sönmez (2008, 2011).)”
Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism (2014, background): “…is sdefficient and sd-envy-free, and that in the limit of large markets, uniformly random versions of many known deterministic mechanisms such as serial dictatorships, hierarchical exchange rules (Pápai 2000), and trading cycles mechanisms (Pycia and Ünver 2011) coincide with this unique mechanism.”