Constrained school choice
By Guillaume Haeringer, Flip Klijn. Journal of Economics Theory, 2009
318 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d09a779203b43d3c5109c4fb9dbd76e8e521aa83
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Parag A. Pathak
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu
- Tayfun Sönmez
- Scott Duke Kominers
- T. Switzer
- Christopher R. Walters
- Umut Mert Dur
- Jonathan Schellenberg
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Parag A. Pathak
- Tayfun Sönmez
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu
- Scott Duke Kominers
- T. Switzer
- Umut Mert Dur
- Julien Grenet
- YingHua He
Citations in the corpus
- Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions (2019, methodology): “For example, Hastings et al. (2008) use data from Charlotte-Mecklenburg public school district, and Abdulkadiroğlu et al.”
- Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (2010, unknown): “As pointed out by Haeringer and Klijn (2007), in the Gale-Shapley and Top Trading Cycles mechanisms a minimal rationality requirement is that the order of the schools in the true preferences is preserved in the revealed list.”
- Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston’s Walk Zones (2018, background): “(37)For analysis of the effects of restricting the number of choices that can be submitted, see the work of Haeringer and Klijn (2009), Calsamiglia, Haeringer, and Kljin (2010), and Pathak and Sönmez (2013).”
- What parents want: school preferences and school choice (2009, methodology): “Closest to this study, Hastings et al. (2008) estimate a mixedlogit demand model for schools using school choice data from Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina. They find that parents value proximity and academic attainment highly and that the preference attached to a school’s mean test score incre”
- Do Parents Value School Effectiveness? (2020, background): “This property, however, requires students to have the option to rank all schools (Haeringer and Klijn, 2009; Pathak and Sönmez, 2013).”
- Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets* (2013, unknown): “See, for instance, Costa and Kahn (2000) for a description of the trends in the labor market choices for college-educated couples since World War II.”
- SCHOOL CHOICE AND EQUITY: CURRENT POLICIES IN OECD COUNTRIES AND A LITERATURE REVIEW (2012, background): “Haeringer and Klijn (2005) highlighted that parents, when they have to choose (by summiting a preference list) adopt strategic behaviours and manipulate their preferences, applying to a “safety school”, even if it is not the optimal choice for them.”
- School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation. NBER Working Paper No. 16783. (2011, unknown): “30 percent of students rank 12 schools, even though there are over 500 choice options in New York City.8 This issue was first theoretically investigated by Haeringer and Klijn (2009) and experimentally by Calsamiglia, Haeringer, and Klijn (2010).”
- Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy (2013, background): “See Haeringer and Klijn (2009) for a theoretical analysis and Calsamiglia, Haeringer, and Klijn (2010) for experimental evidence. of attention not only because it unifies the above-mentioned models but also because it relates matching markets to auctions and formulates how the Gale– Shapley program…”