Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical Analysis

By Yan Chen, Onur Kesten. Journal of Political Economy, 2017

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Temperature and high-stakes cognitive performance: Evidence from the national college entrance examination in China (2018, background): “It is determined by the Provincial Admission Offices based on each year’s admission quota and the distribution of student scores within the province (Chen and Onur Kesten, 2017).”
Assignment Mechanisms under Distributional Constraints (2018, background): “Some applications of SD (with some variations) include school choice (Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2009, Pathak and Sönmez 2013), college admissions (Chen and Kesten 2017, Baswana et al. 2019), on-campus housing, and office allocation (Chen and Snmez 2002).”
Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design (2019, background): “This DA class includes student-proposing DA, serial dictatorship, the immediate acceptance (Boston) mechanism (Ergin and Sönmez, 2006), China’s parallel mechanisms (Chen and Kesten, 2017), England’s first-preferencefirst mechanisms (Pathak and Sönmez, 2013), and the Taiwan mechanism (Dur et al.”
(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice (2017, background): “(1)Examples of countries that use a centralized college admissions process are Turkey (Balinski and Sönmez, 1999); China (Chen and Kesten, 2016); and India (Aygün and Turhan, 2016).”