Board Size and the Variability of Corporate Performance

By Shijun Cheng. 2008

1,250 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/dfb6c615ca3662bd1416e974c8c4fe35d227f308

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Citations in the corpus

Effect of board size and promoter ownership on firm value: some empirical findings from India (2013, background): “Many researchers find a negative association between board size and performance of companies (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Cheng, 2008; Bonn et al., 2004; Boone et al., 2007; O’Connell and Cramer, 2010; Rashid et al., 2010; Conyon and Peck, 1998; De Andres et al., 2005, Ghosh, 2006; Kota a”
Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance under Stakeholder-Oriented Corporate Governance (2020, methodology): “Following [80], standard deviations are calculated over the sample period.”
The Effects of Focus versus Diversification on Bank Performance: Evidence from Chinese Banks (2010, methodology): “Recently, some studies (see, e.g., Adams et al. (2005), Cheng (2008)) have applied the Glejser’s (1969) heteroskedasticity test in their studies of the variability of performance or risks.”
Board structure and survival of new economy IPO firms (2012, positive): “For the purpose of this study, all non-executive directors are classified as ‘independent directors’ following Kang, Cheng and Gray (2007)(7).”
Industry expertise on corporate boards (2017, positive): “In a further attempt to establish the substantiveness of our results, we follow the approach of Cheng (2008) who regresses the dependent variable on lagged values of the endogenous explanatory variable based on the argument that such historical values are predetermined.”
Corporate governance and risk-taking of Chinese firms: The role of board size (2015, methodology): “Consistently, Cheng (2008) shows that firms with smaller boards exhibit higher contemporaneous performance variability andWang (2012) documents that board size has impact on the incentive feature ofmanagerial pay and investment decision as well as the subsequent firm risk.”
Is Environmental Governance Substantive or Symbolic? An Empirical Investigation (2012, background): “In this respect, governance plays a signiﬁcant role in various investment-related decisions, such as acquisitions (e.g., Cheng 2008), restructurings (e.g., Hoskisson et al. 1994), and the development of innovation (e.g., Kroll et al. 2008; Nickerson and Silverman 2003; Tihanyi et al. 2003).”
Do board characteristics drive firm performance? An international perspective (2019, result): “In this sense, previous studies have documented how certain board characteristics, such as board independence (Brown and Caylor, 2006) or size (Jackling and Johl, 2009; Cheng, 2008), among others, influence firm performance.”
Financial Expertise of the Board, Risk Taking, and Performance: Evidence from Bank Holding Companies (2014, neutral): “The negative relation between risk and board size is similar to the results in Pathan (2009) for financial firms and Cheng (2008) for nonfinancial firms.”
Women on board: does boardroom gender diversity affect firm risk? (2016, background): “Cheng (2008) finds that firms with smaller boards have higher performance variability and accounting accruals, and participate more frequently in mergers and acquisitions.”
Does CEO duality constrain board independence? Some evidence from audit pricing (2011, neutral): “This is because it is expected that auditors will assess larger board size to be of higher risk given previous literature that larger board sizes are associated with inefficiency (Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Cheng, 2008) and negative firm performance (Yermack, 1996; Eisen”
Labor-Friendly Corporate Practices: Is What is Good for Employees Good for Shareholders? (2011, methodology): “This same approach is employed by Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), Faleye et al. (2006), Faleye (2007), and Cheng (2008) in similar contexts.”
Do Powerful CEOs Determine Microfinance Performance (2012, methodology): “To test this hypothesis empirically, we use two tests: a heteroscedasticity test (Adams et al., 2005; Cheng, 2008; Pathan, 2009), and a linear regression of the standard deviations of MFI performance over time based on CEO power and several controls.”
Ownership structure, control contestability, and corporate debt maturity (2015, background): “These results are also in line with those of Claessens et al. (2002), Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003), and Boubaker (2007), among others.”
Firm age and performance (2010, background): “Consistent with that, the variability of stock returns is negatively related with incorporation age (Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005) and with listing age (Cheng, 2008).”