Does CEO duality constrain board independence? Some evidence from audit pricing

By M. Bliss. 2011

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How do the ownership structure and board of directors' features impact earnings management? The Spanish case (2020, unknown): “Using data from a sample of Australian public companies, Bliss (2011) found that CEO duality constrains board independence, and therefore derives poorer corporate governance.”
Female audit committee members and their influence on audit fees (2018, unknown): “They also examine the relationship between various aspects of corporate governance and audit fees (Bliss, 2011; Boo and Sharma, 2008; Carcello, Hermanson, Neal, and Riley, 2002; Chan, Liu, and Sun 2013; Griffin, Lont, and Sun, 2008; Larcker and Richardson, 2004).”
Audit Committee, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from India (2016, background): “Bliss (2011) stated that CEO duality is an obstacle for the independence of the board. Researchers such as Brickley et al. (1997); Dahya et al. (1996) argued that a dual CEO role was important as it reduced chances of clashes on viewpoint and enabled timely decision making.”
Examining the influence of corporate governance on intellectual capital efficiency: Evidence from top service firms in Australia (2015, background): “Bliss (2011), also using a sample of 799 Australian firms, found that CEO duality negatively affects the monitoring function of boards and, as a result, boards’ demand for high-quality audits.”