Contingent Political Capital and International Alliances: Evidence from South Korea

By Jordan I. Siegel. 2007

478 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Sociology and Political Science, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c992e0b840b1fd8877753acba5459c67dd5d0488

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Citations in the corpus

Institutional Strategies in Emerging Markets (2015, background): “Relational strategies involve networking efforts to cultivate and manage dependency relationships with the government and key stakeholder groups (Marquis & Qian, 2014; Siegel, 2007).”
The Effects of Political Connections and State Ownership on Corporate Litigation in China (2011, background): “…as the awarding of licenses, government contracts, bailouts for distressed firms, and planning permissions (Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell 2006; Fisman 2001; Johnson and Mitton 2003; Charumilind, Kali, and Witwattanakantang 2006; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 2006; Khawajia and Mian 2005; Siegel 2005).”
Competitive position, managerial ties, and profitability of foreign firms in China: an interactive perspective (2009, background): “Siegel (2007) similarly observes that Korean politicians target their support to local Korean firms rather than foreign companies; in fact, politicians and government officials often want to avoid being seen as even indirectly supportive of foreign companies.”
Human Capital and CEO Compensation during Institutional Transitions (2015, unknown): “Because increased marketization generally reduces resource dependencies on governments, the value of political ties may decline (Nee, 1989; Siegel, 2007).”
The three faces of China: Strategic alliance partner selection in three ethnic Chinese economies (2014, methodology): “…political forces (as explained earlier) largely exogenous to the firms in our sample, these three different economies serve effectively as exogenous sources of variation for cleanly identifying the effects of location-based institutions on firms’ strategic alliance partner decisions (Siegel, 2007).”
Theories of the (state-owned) firm (2016, background): “While most firms—regardless of ownership—value political resources and capabilities (Li, He, Lan, & Yiu, 2012; Li & Zhang, 2007; Siegel, 2007), we argue that political Minority shareholders Principal-Agent Conflicts Professional managers resources and capabilities are especially likely to be a…”
POLITICAL CAPABILITIES, POLICY RISK, AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY: EVIDENCE FROM THE GLOBAL ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION INDUSTRY † (2010, background): “Paralleling the distinction originally made by Amit and Schoemaker (1993) in the context of a firm’s market environment, we conceive of a firm’s ‘political resources’ as stocks of available political factors to which the firm gains access, primarily ties with pivotal political actors (Faccio, 2006; ”
Using Organization Structure to Buffer Political Ties in Emerging Markets: A Case Study (2012, background): “…behavior in these countries cannot be obtained without incurring significant risks – for example, when regime changes take place (Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Siegel, 2007) or political agents extract excessive rents from the benefiting firms (Fan, Won & Zhang, 2007; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994).”
Overcoming Institutional Voids: A Reputation-Based View of Long Run Survival (2017, methodology): “We contribute to research on emerging markets (e.g. Guillen, 2000; Henisz, Dorobantu, and Nartey, 2014; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Luo and Chung, 2013; Mair, Martí, and Ventresca, 2012; Siegel, 2007) by proposing reputation as a meta-resource that can help firms mitigate and capitalize on institutiona”
Portfolios of Political Ties and Business Group Strategy in Emerging Economies (2014, unknown): “Conversely, maintaining good relations with only one political party makes the focal firm vulnerable to the adverse effects of regime change (Siegel, 2007).”
Ownership of Corporations (2016, background): “Numerous other approaches have been identified to cultivate political connections with key governmental officials (Li et al., 2012; Siegel, 2007), even as far as arranged wedding between business group family members and governmental officials (Bunkanwanicha, Fan, & Wiwattanakantang, 2013).”
A Review of the Nonmarket Strategy Literature (2016, unknown): “While much of the research emphasizes the mechanisms through which firms generate value through political strategies, a more recent line of inquiry trend starts to note the vulnerabilities of nonmarket strategies through political buffering (J. Siegel, 2007; Sun et al., 2012).”
Sub‐National Institutional Contingencies, Network Positions, and IJV Partner Selection (2012, unknown): “a relational view and emphasized that in emerging economies local partners’ political connections are an important and favourable attribute that foreign partners tend to value (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2006; Siegel, 2007).”
Political tie heterogeneity and the impact of adverse shocks on firm value (2015, unknown): “When erratic political rivalry leads opponents to dominate the political process, firms linked with the incumbent political group are at considerable risk of suffering from ‘negative cascades of discrimination, resource exclusion, and even expropriation and sabotage’ (Siegel, 2007, p. 625).”
Retire in Peace: Officials’ Political Incentives and Corporate Diversification in China* (2018, background): “parties (Siegel, 2007; Kozhikode and Li, 2012; Zhu and Chung, 2014), the agency of individual officials has not become central to the analysis.”