Using Organization Structure to Buffer Political Ties in Emerging Markets: A Case Study
By M. Dieleman, J. Boddewyn. 2012
185 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Sociology and Political Science, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2e53df5e25a330313d691fb97e2b0bc0fa08637e
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Mike W. Peng
- Garry D. Bruton
- Jonathan P. Doh
- Ciprian Stan
- Tazeeb S. Rajwani
- Yuanyuan Huang
- Muhammad Anwar
- T. Lawton
In Sociology and Political Science
- Tazeeb S. Rajwani
- Muhammad Anwar
- Ciprian Stan
- Mike W. Peng
- H. Ahmed
- Songling Yang
- Muhammad Ishtiaq
- Garry D. Bruton
In Strategy and Management
- Mike W. Peng
- Garry D. Bruton
- Jonathan P. Doh
- Tazeeb S. Rajwani
- Yuanyuan Huang
- Ciprian Stan
- Muhammad Ishtiaq
- H. Ahmed
Citations in the corpus
- International business responses to institutional voids (2017, background): “The weak or fluid nature of institutions in emerging markets suggests that activities of firms revolve more around social networks and on family or other social connections (e.g., Dieleman & Boddewyn, 2012).”
- The Role of Government Support in Sustainable Competitive Position and Firm Performance (2018, background): “Although, a majority of SMEs in emerging economies receive lack of government incentive and services which may hinder their survival and growth [13,14].”
- Human Capital and CEO Compensation during Institutional Transitions (2015, unknown): “A darker view is to argue that some of these political ties may result in corruption (Dieleman and Boddewyn, 2012).”
- Do Political Connections Buffer Firms from or Bind Firms to the Government? A Study of Corporate Charitable Donations of Chinese Firms (2016, unknown): “In emerging markets, such a buffering effect is seen as an effective mechanism to protect firms from government rent-seeking behavior (Chen et al. 2011, Dieleman and Boddewyn 2012).”
- A Review of the Nonmarket Strategy Literature (2016, unknown): “…(J. Siegel, 2007; Sun et al., 2010), powerful politicians and stakeholders may appropriate the rents once created from the buffering mechanisms (Dieleman & Boddewyn, 2012), and agency considerations, rather than organizational-rent-generation motives, may drive the buffering activities (Hadani…”
- Theories of the (state-owned) firm (2016, background): “…SOEs compete with private start-ups and foreign entrants on product markets, SOEs’ political ties may become valuable, rare, and hard-to-imitate, especially in industries with heavy state influence (such as telecoms, transportation, and construction) (Dieleman & Boddewyn, 2012; Li et al., 2013).”
- Advancing Nonmarket Strategy Research: Institutional Perspectives in a Changing World (2012, methodology): “This is a complex intemational ptocess, as the work of Dieleman and Boddewyn (2012) shows.”