Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top executive turnover in Italy

By Paolo F. Volpin. 2002

560 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/92342bfb8789c82a27358887b59a7df04589ec70

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Citations in the corpus

Does Takeover Activity Cause Managerial Discipline? Evidence from International M&A Laws (2015, unknown): “19 and Norton (2003), we correct the coefficient on the interaction term for the nonlinearity of the probit specification, and continue to find a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term between takeover law and lagged earnings ratio (0.”
Family Firm Governance, Strategic Conformity, and Performance: Institutional vs. Strategic Perspectives (2013, background): “Given their track records, their expertise of the business is unlikely to be questioned by outsiders (Volpin 2002).”
Are Family Firms Good Employers (2017, background): “…2010), using firm resources to advance the family’s personal welfare (Schulze et al., 2001), securing employment and benefits for family members (Volpin, 2002), and the adoption of governance structures that assure the family’s continued control of the enterprise (Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung,…”
The Effect of Family Control on Firm Value and Performance. Evidence from Continental Europe (2006, unknown): “There is no comprehensive evidence concerning European corporations, while the results of single-country studies (Gorton and Schmid, 2000; Volpin, 2002; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003; Sraer and Thesmar, 2004) give rise to a contrasted picture about the effect of family control.”
CEO turnover in insider-dominated boards: The Italian case (2003, unknown): “This strong entrenchment effect extends to the turnover of all top executives as documented in another study of board turnover in Italian listed companies ( Volpin, 2002 ).”
Earnings Management in Family Firms: Evidence From R&D Cost Capitalization in Italy (2008, background): “First, earlier research (Bianchi & Enriques, 1999; Brunello et al., 2003; Corbetta & Minichilli, 2005; Montemerlo, 2000; Volpin, 2002) has shown that in Italian family businesses, a large part of the controlling family’s wealth is invested in the company.”
CEO Ownership, External Governance, and Risk-taking (2011, unknown): “Volpin (2002) and Atanassov and Kim (2009) find top managers who are major shareholders are less likely to be dismissed for poor performance than top managers with small or no equity stakes.”
Auditor choice in privatized firms: Empirical evidence on the role of state and foreign owners (2009, background): “…related-party transactions, covertly issuing shares to relatives, and even blatant theft (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; OECD, 1999; Johnson et al., 2000; and Volpin, 2002)⎯imply that Big Four auditors play an important economic role in constraining insiders’ discretion over financial reporting.”
Corporate governance in the 2007–2008 financial crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide (2012, unknown): “ownership (Volpin, 2002).”
Multiple large shareholders and corporate investment: Evidence from China (2018, unknown): “Many studies (Volpin, 2002; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 2008; and Attig et al., 2009) have shown a positive impact of MLS on ﬁ rm value, suggesting a reduction of expropriation of private bene ﬁ ts in the presence of more contestable large shareholders.”
Labor and Corporate Governance: International Evidence from Restructuring Decisions (2009, unknown): “20 Volpin (2002) finds that the likelihood of CEO turnover for Italian companies depends on whether the top executive is (a family member of) the controlling shareholder.”