CEO turnover in insider-dominated boards: The Italian case

By Giorgio Brunello, Clara Graziano, Bruno Parigi. 2003

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Government ownership and corporate governance: Evidence from the EU. (2012, unknown): “Higher institutional ownership is not linked with improved corporate governance, echoing the relative ineffectiveness of these monitors discussed by Renneboog (2000) and Brunello et al. (2003) in European settings.”
Owner‐Management, Firm Age, and Productivity in Italian Family Firms (2014, background): “This finding is also consistent with empirical evidence that Italian family firms stick with their management even in hard times (Brunello et al., 2003; Volpin, 2002; Lippi and Schivardi, 2009).8 Besides, an age-related effect on efficiency can also be observed if innovation or involvement in…”
Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective (2003, unknown): “For example, Brunello, Graziano, and Parigi (2003) argue that concentrated ownership, family control, limited institutional investor activism, and lack of bank monitoring result in the Italian corporate governance structure that is dominated by insiders.”
Earnings Management in Family Firms: Evidence From R&D Cost Capitalization in Italy (2008, background): “Prior studies suggest that the closer the relationship between the executives and the family, the lower the sensitivity of turnover to firm performance (Brunello et al., 2003; Volpin, 2002).”