Auditor choice in privatized firms: Empirical evidence on the role of state and foreign owners

By Omrane Guedhami, Jeffrey A. Pittman, Walid Saffar. 2009

291 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/60c124760a1533dd6372647693135b30a04861e0

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Citations in the corpus

The Role of State and Foreign Owners in Corporate Risk-Taking: Evidence from Privatization (2013, methodology): “The results 3 We follow the standard practice in the privatization literature and exclude firms from ex-communist countries (Megginson et al., 2004; Boubakri et al., 2005; Guedhami et al., 2009).”
Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms (2015, background): “Moreover, these financial reporting incentives shift as the firm becomes more or less exposed to these political incentives over time, such as following privatization events (e.g., Guedhami and Pittman [2006] , Wang, Wong, and Xia [2008] , Guedhami, Pittman, and Saffar [2009] ).”
Foreign institutional ownership and auditor choice: Evidence from worldwide institutional ownership (2018, background): “Prior studies provide evidence that the role of high-quality audits is more salient when ex-ante information asymmetry is higher (Choi and Wong 2007; Guedhami et al. 2009; Guedhami et al. 2014).”
Political connections and the cost of equity capital (2012, unknown): “to extract private benefits for political purposes, Guedhami et al. (2008) provide firm-level”
The Global Financial Crisis, Family Control, and Dividend Policy: The Global Financial Crisis, Family Control, and Dividend Policy (2016, unknown): “…Lins et al. (2013), helps avoid multicollinearity stemming from high correlations between the test variables (here, FAMILY and AGENCY) and their interaction term, especially when the interaction comprises a dummy variable (e.g., Lang, Lins, and Miller, 2004; Guedhami, Pittman, and Saffar, 2009).”
Do state and foreign ownership affect investment efficiency? Evidence from privatizations (2017, unknown): “…prior research on the role of ownership type in shaping post-privatization outcomes such as financial reporting choices and risk-taking (e.g., Guedhami et al., 2009; Boubakri et al., 2013), and we contribute to empirical research on the performance outcomes of privatization by identifying…”
State ownership reinvented? Explaining performance differences between state‐owned and private firms (2018, unknown): “Moreover, there is a literature that finds that post-privatization residual ownership affects corporate governance (Borisova et al., 2012; Omrane Guedhami et al., 2009), the cost of capital (Borisova & Megginson, 2011), . valuation (Boubakri et al., 2017), and innovation (Cao et al., 2016;…”
The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting (2010, background): “In related papers, Wang, Wong, and Xia (2008) and Guedhami, Pittman, and Saffar (2009) find that state-owned firms are less likely to hire a large, high quality auditor.”
Audit Quality and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Microfinance Industry (2012, unknown): “Furthermore, consistent with a published finding that foreign owners require more credible financial statements to reduc agency costs (Guedhami et al., 2009), Leuz et al. (2009) find that foreigners avoid investments in poorly governed firms (cf. Doidge et al., 2009).”
Auditor Choice in Politically Connected Firms (2014, unknown): “Second, insiders intending to materially distort their firms’ financial statements by, for example, overstating earnings to conceal their diversionary activities may prefer to hire a non-Big Four auditor in order to fly under the radar when they begin accumulating private benefits at the expense of ”
Government ownership and corporate governance: Evidence from the EU. (2012, unknown): “Self-serving government behavior could be behind the significant negative relation between golden shares and board transparency measures, as the state seeks control of auditing decisions and related-party transactions (Guedhami et al., 2009).”