Does Takeover Activity Cause Managerial Discipline? Evidence from International M&A Laws
By Ugur Lel, Darius P. Miller. 2015
194 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2569d6d11b975bf929ee4a17cd5337fafc9977a7
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Todd A. Gormley
- David A. Matsa
- Erik P. Gilje
- Adrien Matray
- Caroline Flammer
- Jennifer Brown
- Sirui Yin
- Xiaoran Ni
In Economics and Econometrics
- Todd A. Gormley
- David A. Matsa
- Cesare Fracassi
- Erik P. Gilje
- Allen Carrion
- Da Ke
- Jarrad Harford
- Sirui Yin
Citations in the corpus
- Do Takeover Laws Matter? Evidence from Five Decades of Hostile Takeovers (2017, unknown): “Lel and Miller (2015) provide evidence that links takeover activity and managerial discipline to the legal environment in an international setting.”
- Economic Policy Uncertainty And Corporate Cash Holdings (2017, unknown): “External governance mechanisms are stronger when firms are more likely to be taken over (as indicated by higher takeover index) (Lel and Miller, 2015; Cain et al., 2017) or threatened by stronger product market competitors (as proxied by a higher fluidity index) (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Giroud…”
- Playing It Safe? Managerial Preferences, Risk, and Agency Conflicts (2016, background): “…the initial press announcement of antitakeover legislation in a state is associated with a negative stock price reaction for affected firms, and Lel and Miller (2015) find that CEO turnover is more sensitive to poor firm performance after countries adopt laws that reduce barriers to takeover…”