CEO Ownership, External Governance, and Risk-taking

By E. H. Kim, Yao Lu. 2011

449 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/39a488434afec6aebda340fbf1aaf02e8403e17d

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Social Responsibility and CEO Risk-Taking Incentives (2016, unknown): “The mean values for community involvement (COMS) and diversity (DIVS) are positive, whereas the average scores 5 Prior studies (Kim and Lu, 2011; Hayes et. al., 2012) suggest that corporate governance factors influence managers’ risk-taking incentives; therefore, we add the percentage of…”
Governance Mechanisms and Family Firms (2018, background): “Finally, it overlooks the less codified and nonbinding governance pressures that emanate in the institutional environment from the market for corporate control, competitors, and society-at-large (Denis & McConnell, 2003; Kim & Lu, 2011).”
Women on board: does boardroom gender diversity affect firm risk? (2016, background): “We also contribute to a broader literature that has documented the relations between firm risk-taking and other corporate governance characteristics, including CEO gender, financial expertise, ownership, compensation and the presence of institutional investors (e.g. Faccio et al., 2014; Wahal and Mc”
Social Capital and Debt Contracting: Evidence from Bank Loans and Public Bonds (2017, unknown): “3 Cooperative norms are non-religious social norms that constrain narrow self-interest (Knack and Keefer (1997)), limit opportunistic behaviors in transactions (Coleman (1988)), and help to overcome the free rider problem (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2010)).”
Playing It Safe? Managerial Preferences, Risk, and Agency Conflicts (2016, background): “Tarhan, 2016), that CEOs’ risk preferences affect their firms’ responses to changes in the firms’ risk environment (Gormley and Matsa, 2011; Panousi and Papanikolaou, 2012), and that executives’ compensation and contracts affect how managers act on their risk preferences (e.g., Hirshleifer and Suh, ”
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “A sizeable literature, going back to Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), relates rm value, usually measured as Tobins Q, to executivesequity incentives (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Mehran, 1995; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia, 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Habib ”
The influence of CEO demographic characteristics on corporate risk-taking: evidence from Chinese IPOs (2016, background): “Kim and Lu (2011) find that a high level of CEOs’ ownership may discourage them from taking risk unless mitigated by strong external governance mechanisms.”
Married CEOs and corporate social responsibility (2019, unknown): “Moreover, following Kim and Lu (2011), we use Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI, constructed from revenues reported in Compustat database) of market concentration as a proxy for external governance.”