The Effect of Family Control on Firm Value and Performance. Evidence from Continental Europe

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Institutional Investors, Political Connections, and the Incidence of Regulatory Enforcement Against Corporate Fraud (2014, background): “As is the case in China, political connectedness and state control are prevalent in many countries (Barontini and Caprio 2006; Faccio 2006; Klapper et al. 2006).”
Family Control and Financing Decisions (2011, positive): “Following Barontini and Caprio (2006) and Caprio, Croci, and Del Giudice (2010), we focus on relatively large companies, whose value in total assets (Worldscope item WC07230) exceeds US$ 250 million at the end of 1997.”
Governance of Family Firms (2015, background): “Barontini & Caprio (2006) find no such discount in Western Europe and neither do Andres (2008) in Germany and González et al. (2012) in Colombia.”
Owner‐Management, Firm Age, and Productivity in Italian Family Firms (2014, background): “This classification is the national version of the European nomenclature, Nace Rev. 2. member of the owner family are more or less productive than non-family-managed firms.”