Earnings Management in Family Firms: Evidence From R&D Cost Capitalization in Italy

By Annalisa Prencipe, G. Markarian, Lorenzo Pozza. 2008

250 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ca93f63e952c7d97642d02299f13d7e634c7439d

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In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Citations in the corpus

Socioemotional Wealth and Earnings Management in Private Family Firms (2010, background): “…financial interests, these stakeholders may pressure family firms to add independent directors to the board, try to gain a seat on the board themselves (Chrisman et al., 2004; Fiegener, Brown, Dreux, & Dennis, 2000), or include restrictive covenants in the loan contract (Prencipe et al., 2008).”
Financial Reporting and the Protection of Socioemotional Wealth in Family-Controlled Firms (2014, background): “Thus, family owners that prioritise control will be particularly sensitive to the implications of debt covenant violations and therefore, they would be more likely to engage in earnings management to avoid the risk of cancellation or renegotiation of the debt (Prencipe et al., 2008).”
Bank Income Smoothing, Ownership Concentration and the Regulatory Environment (2014, unknown): “Prencipe et al. (2008) show that family-controlled firms display higher levels of earnings management, consistent with the hypothesis that controlling families manipulate earnings to cover self-oriented behavior.”
Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Family-Controlled Companies (2011, background): “Prencipe, Markarian, and Pozza (2008) show that incentives to carry out earnings management for Italian-listed family firms differ from those related to non-family-controlled companies.”
Accounting Research in Family Firms: Theoretical and Empirical Challenges (2014, methodology): “A relevant consequence of this trait is that for managers of family firms typical motivations related to the executive job market are less important (Prencipe et al., 2008).”
The Impact of Controlling Families and Family CEOs on Earnings Management (2010, background): “A serious information asymmetry and entrenchment problem will emerge between controlling families and minority shareholders rather than between controlling families and managers (Prencipe et al., 2008; Sacristán-Navarro & Gómez-Ansón, 2007).”