Dominant CEO, deviant strategy, and extreme performance: the moderating role of a powerful board

By Jianyun Tang, Mary M. Crossan, W. Rowe. 2012

283 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Do Powerful CEOs Determine Microfinance Performance (2012, unknown): “The power of a particular group member thus should lead to more extreme outcomes, as confirmed by several empirical studies (e.g., Adams et al., 2005; Cheng, 2008; Kogan and Wallach, 1966; Tang et al., 2011).”
CEO Narcissism, Risk-Taking, and Resilience: An Empirical Analysis in U.S. Commercial Banks (2019, background): “, 2011), more knowledgeable directors—for example, because of their banking background—that are not part of the bank’s insider representation will be more successful in identifying potentially unsound and deviant strategies initiated by the bank’s CEO (Tang et al., 2011).”
CEO Career Variety: Effects on Firm-Level Strategic and Social Novelty (2014, methodology): “For each year, we took each variable and calculated the standardized absolute difference between the firm’s score and the industry mean (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Tang et al., 2011).”
Social, Behavioral, and Cognitive Influences on Upper Echelons During Strategy Process (2016, background): “More specifically, research on power suggests the most desirable level of CEO power depends on the firm’s specific situation and also may depend on the existence of other governance mechanisms such as powerful boards (Tang et al., 2011).”