A Bargaining Theory of Distribution Channels

By Eric T. Anderson, David R. Bell, Andrew Mitchell, C. Narasimhan, A. Rao, D. Soberman. 2003

403 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Marketing, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5d56242ee362fc16533c46b45c6eb9c49647cece

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Citations in the corpus

Price Discrimination in Input Markets (2009, background): “This assumption is shared with, for instance, Katz (1987), DeGraba (1990), and Yoshida (2000).”
Influence of customer participation on creating and sharing of new product value (2008, background): “Research supports that both of these mechanisms operate to determine the ultimate share received by each partner, where power drives the pursuit of more absolute value, and fairness drives the value allocation toward equity (but not necessarily equality) between the two bargainers (Iyer and Villas-B”
Promoting electric automobiles: supply chain analysis under a government’s subsidy incentive scheme (2013, methodology): “Note from Jiskha.com (2010) that, in 2010, the transaction prices of new fuel cars roughly satisfy a normal distribution with mean $23,000 and standard deviation $3,500.”
Retail Mergers: Buyer Power and Product Variety (2007, neutral): “For an endogenization of non-efficient contracts in retailing, see also Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003).”
Store within a Store (2010, background): “This phenomenon of increasing retailer power has motivated recent research (e.g., Bloom and Perry 2001; Dukes, Gal-Or, and Srinivasan 2006; Geylani, Dukes, and Srinivasan 2006; Iyer and Villas-Boas 2003; Raju and Zhang 2005).”
Strategic Customer Behavior, Commitment, and Supply Chain Performance (2008, background): “example, Jacobson and Obermiller (1990), Krishna et al.”
The Strategic Role of Third‐Party Marketplaces in Retailing (2014, neutral): “In an asymmetric information context (the retailer has better information than manufacturer), Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003) have shown that it is better for the manufacturer to let the retailer be powerful in the bar-gaining process.”
Do private labels increase retailer bargaining power? (2010, methodology): “According to the Nash Bargaining framework (Iyer and Villas-Boas 2003), the gains from trade are split according to the bargaining power of the manufacturer and the retailer.”
A Larger Slice or a Larger Pie? An Empirical Investigation of Bargaining Power in the Distribution Channel (2008, background): “To ensure that bargaining is only on wholesale price, and not on nonlinear tariffs, we follow Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003) in assuming that products are not fully specifiable in a contract.”