A Larger Slice or a Larger Pie? An Empirical Investigation of Bargaining Power in the Distribution Channel
By Michaela Draganska, Daniel Klapper, Sofia Berto Villas-Boas. Marketing science (Providence, R.I.), 2008
312 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Marketing, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cb80ef57f5c12f2c2dd683fa708c647a10a3aaca
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In Economics and Econometrics
- Allan Collard-Wexler
- Qi Feng
- Lauren Xiaoyuan Lu
- Robin S. Lee
- Gautam Gowrisankaran
- Philipp Schmidt-Dengler
- Martin Pesendorfer
In Marketing
- Allan Collard-Wexler
- Qi Feng
- Lauren Xiaoyuan Lu
- Robin S. Lee
- Gautam Gowrisankaran
- Philipp Schmidt-Dengler
- Martin Pesendorfer
In Strategy and Management
Citations in the corpus
- Channel Selection and Contracting in the Presence of a Retail Platform (2018, background): “A more general setting is to assume that the revenue-sharing rate r is negotiated through a generalized Nash-bargaining (GNB) mechanism (Draganska et al. 2010), where the manufacturer holds bargaining power a and the platform retailer holds 1 (cid:1) a .”
- Do private labels increase retailer bargaining power? (2010, unknown): “Misra and Mohanty (2006) and Draganska et al. (2009) use this metric to estimate bargaining power.”
- “Nash-in-Nash” Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work (2014, background): “C.31 Many applied papers examine richer environments in which, for instance, firms agree on two-part or linear tariffs and then engage in further competition conditioning on these contracts (e.g., Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas 2010; Crawford and Yurukoglu 2012).”
- Supply Chain Contracting Under Competition: Bilateral Bargaining vs. Stackelberg (2013, background): “Several papers apply the Nash-Nash solution concept to investigate negotiations between firms in competing channels (see, e.g., Dukes and Gal-Or 2003, Shaffer and Zettelmeyer 2004, Dukes, Gal-Or and Srinivasan 2006).”
- The Welfare Effects of Vertical Integration in Multichannel Television Markets (2015, unknown): “Such timing assumptions have been used in Nocke and White (2007), Draganska et al. (2010), and Ho and Lee (2017).40 An alternative timing assumption, more typical in the literature on vertical contracting, would be to assume that affiliate fees are first negotiated, and then distributor prices and b”