Executive Pay, Hidden Compensation and Managerial Entrenchment
By Camelia M. Kuhnen, Jeffrey Zwiebel. 2008
126 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0cf374b29de3851dc7874136fb8988af97e370c0
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Carola Frydman
- Florian S. Peters
- Alexander F. Wagner
- Raven E. Saks
- Kelly Shue
- Yaniv Grinstein
- Lisa A. Keister
- Martijn Cremers
In Economics and Econometrics
- Carola Frydman
- Florian S. Peters
- Alexander F. Wagner
- Raven E. Saks
- P. Ganong
- Daniel Shoag
- Albert Saiz
- C. Hilber
Citations in the corpus
- Performance Terms in CEO Compensation Contracts (2015, unknown): “2 Other empirical studies such as Yermack (1997), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000, 2001), Lie (2005), Bebchuk and Jackson (2005), Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2008), and Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2010), all point to the positive relation between lack of transparency in contractual terms and…”
- Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “44 Even though most forms of compensation, including perks, pensions, and severance pay, can be part of an optimal contract, hiding these compensation elements from shareholders is suggestive of rent extraction (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Kuhnen and Zwiebel, 2009).”
- Yesterday's Heroes: Compensation and Risk at Financial Firms (2015, unknown): “The idea is that entrenchment is more feasible when there is less transparency, for example, as in Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2008).”
- Managerial Ownership Dynamics and Firm Value (2009, unknown): “Shareholders can overcome costs of collective action and fire managers, but costs of collective action are assumed to be high enough that management draws substantial rents from its position (see Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2007) and Lambrecht and Myers (2007) for such formulations).”
- Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Dynamics (2012, unknown): “The positive average relation suggests that executive pay and managerial entrenchment (hidden pay) are complementary compensation mechanisms (see Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2008)).”
- Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives (2010, unknown): “Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2009) take a different approach, by modeling pay as being set by the CEO himself, subject to limits on his entrenchment.”
- The Executive Turnover Risk Premium (2014, background): “(9)This idea of partial entrenchment has been modeled in the context of hidden compensation in Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2007).”
- Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005 (2010, background): “(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Kuhnen and Zwiebel, 2007).”