CEOs' Outside Employment Opportunities and the Lack of Relative Performance Evaluation in Compensation Contracts

By Shivaram Rajgopal, Terry Shevlin, Valentina L. Zamora. 2006

428 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/596eb0ae748a38ebb60acf77140628e40dcadcec

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Citations in the corpus

Peer Firms in Relative Performance Evaluation (2009, positive): “Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora (2006) find that the lack of RPE is due to the fact that CEO pay varies with outside employment opportunities (as in Himmelberg and Hubbard, 2000).”
Relative Performance Evaluation and Related Peer Groups in Executive Compensation Contracts (2011, positive): “Rajgopal et al. (2006) predict and find that firms are less likely to filter out industry and market-wide performance when compensating more 20 We classify activist institutions following Cremers and Nair (2005).”
Bank liquidity creation and risk-taking: : Does managerial ability matter? (2016, neutral): “Similarly, Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora (2006) find that CEO compensation is systematically linked to talent, which indicates that the ability of managers is recognized by the firm.”
Does one hat fit all? The case of corporate leadership structure (2007, background): “Rajgopal et al. (2006 ) i s another recent study that uses press appearances as a proxy for CEO reputation.”
Compensation committee governance quality, chief executive officer stock option grants, and future firm performance (2009, methodology): “The value of new stock option grants is calculated using the Black-Scholes model similar to Rajgopal et al. (2006). Specifically, we collect the exercise price, stock price at the grant date, number of securities granted, and the time to maturity from the Execucomp database.”
Framing Controversial Actions: Regulatory Focus, Source Credibility, and Stock Market Reaction to Poison Pill Adoption (2014, background): “However, consistent with the findings of Rajgopal et al. (2006), this prestige measure is positively and significantly correlated with our visibility measure (r .14, p .001).”
Peer Choice in CEO Compensation (2012, neutral): “Finally, our third measure, the extent of media coverage, is based on the idea that the business press tends to cover CEOs who are recognized as talented, high achievers, or role models in their industries (see Falato et al., 2011; Milbourn, 2003; Rajgopal et al., 2006).”
Readability of Narrative Disclosures in 10-K Reports: Does Managerial Ability Matter? (2018, positive): “Alternative managerial ability (MA_ALTER) is proxied by industry-adjusted value-weighted stock return (e.g. Fee & Hadlock, 2003; Milbourn, 2003; Rajgopal et al., 2006).”
Managerial Ability and Income Smoothing (2019, positive): “This argument is consistent with that in Ronen and Sadan (1981), who adopt Spence’s (1973) model to predict firms’ smoothing.”