A Behavioral Theory of Corporate Governance: Explicating the Mechanisms of Socially Situated and Socially Constituted Agency

By James D. Westphal, Edward J. Zajac. 2013

406 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Safety Research, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/43a58b2a762eac83e58d9b9a048e64ca11d820a8

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In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

In Safety Research

In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

Board Interlocks and Firm Performance: Toward a Combined Agency–Resource Dependence Perspective (2018, background): “Behavioral scholars examine ties in reference to social behaviors/contexts (see Westphal & Zajac, 2013, for a review and Westphal, Boivie, & Chng, 2006 for an exception).”
CEO Narcissism and the Impact of Prior Board Experience on Corporate Strategy (2015, positive): “Although an increasing stream of research has examined how boards of directors may influence firms’ strategic decisions (see review by Westphal and Zajac, 2013), this literature has not considered the notion that directors’ influence over strategy may depend on the CEO’s personalities.”
Ownership, Activism and Engagement: Institutional Investors as Active Owners (2016, neutral): “While parts of the corporate governance literature view owners as a simple construct of value-maximizing agents, recent scholarly work and policy documents have acknowledged the heterogeneity of investors (Isaksson & Çelik, 2013; Wang, 2014; Westphal & Zajac, 2013).”
Greenwash vs. Brownwash: Exaggeration and Undue Modesty in Corporate Sustainability Disclosure (2015, background): “In organizational theory, this includes a large body of work on decoupling and symbolic management (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Pfeffer 1981; Westphal and Zajac 1998, 2013).”
Recategorization into the In-group (2014, background): “…basis of social categorization, existing directors tend to favor new directors who are similar to them on salient demographic characteristics (see review by Westphal and Zajac, 2013), explaining why traditionally the degree of demographic homogeneity among directors has remained relatively high.”
Too Unsafe to Monitor? How Board–CEO Cognitive Conflict and Chair Leadership Shape Outside Director Monitoring (2020, background): “…of the boardroom, directors may not welcome or even respond constructively to a colleague disagreeing with management (Westphal & Khanna, 2003;Westphal & Zajac, 2013; Zhu, 2013) as this behavior can “raise eyebrows . . . [and is] an act that fellow directors might see as noncollegial, time…”
National Governance System, Corporate Ownership, and Roles of Outside Directors: A Corporate Governance Bundle Perspective (2014, neutral): “Meanwhile, the sociological perspective of corporate governance indicates that outside directors’ behavior is also influenced by informational and incentive constraints and their interplay with organizational elites, such as large owners (North, 1990; Westphal & Zajac, 2013).”