Matching with Contracts: Comment

By Orhan Aygün, Tayfun Sönmez. 2013

219 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Computational Theory and Mathematics, Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b8b1709f3f96c6c5c9c7d5868931d740a653ac33

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Computational Theory and Mathematics

1. Michael Ostrovsky
2. Tayfun Sönmez
3. John William Hatfield
4. Scott Duke Kominers
5. M. Bumin Yenmez
6. Federico Echenique

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Tayfun Sönmez
2. Alexander Westkamp
3. Scott Duke Kominers
4. John William Hatfield
5. Parag A. Pathak
6. M. Bumin Yenmez
7. Umut Mert Dur
8. Federico Echenique

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Tayfun Sönmez
2. Alexander Westkamp
3. Parag A. Pathak
4. Scott Duke Kominers
5. John William Hatfield
6. M. Bumin Yenmez
7. Umut Mert Dur
8. Federico Echenique

Citations in the corpus

• Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts (2012, unknown): “21Hatfield and Kojima (2008) show that substitutes is not necessary to guarantee existence of a stable allocation for many-to-one matching with contracts.”
• A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets (2016, unknown): “More closely related to Hatfield et al. (2016) are papers that consider whether competition gives school administrators incentives to perform better, such as Hoxby’s (1999) model of moral hazard in which families may move and school districts compete for resources.”
• Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston’s Walk Zones (2018, background): “1 of Kominers and Sönmez (2013)—that the choice functions in our setting satisfy both the substitutability condition of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) and the irrelevance of rejected contracts condition of Aygün and Sönmez (2013).”
• How to Control Controlled School Choice (2015, background): “When choice rules are path independent, DA produces the studentoptimal stable matching (Roth, 1984; Aygün and Sönmez, 2013; Chambers and Yenmez, 2013).”
• Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Trading Networks (2013, background): “In the setting of two-sided many-to-one matching with transfers, Kelso and Crawford (1982) show that substitutability is sufficient for the existence of stable outcomes and competitive equilibria; Gul and Stacchetti (1999) and Hatfield and Kojima (2008) prove corresponding necessity results.”