Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy
By Tayfun Sönmez, T. Switzer. 2013
237 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fdbedbe0136366c741e1fcee9f34b1b965fff73a
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Thayer Morrill
- Lars Ehlers
- Amin Saberi
- Makoto Yokoo
- Itai Ashlagi
- Masahiro Goto
- Akihisa Tamura
- Ali Shameli
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Thayer Morrill
- Lars Ehlers
- Amin Saberi
- Makoto Yokoo
- Itai Ashlagi
- Masahiro Goto
- Akihisa Tamura
- Ali Shameli
Citations in the corpus
- Designing Matching Mechanisms under General Distributional Constraints (2015, methodology): “The cadet-branch matching program organized by United States Military Academy (USMA) imposes minimum quotas on the number of cadets who can be assigned to each branch Sönmez and Switzer (2013).”
- Assignment Mechanisms under Distributional Constraints (2018, background): “Quotas are imposed when assigning cadets to army branches (Sönmez and Switzer 2013).”
- Matching with Contracts: Comment (2013, unknown): “The use of choice functions as primitives is not limited to theoretical matching literature, and it is also the case for some recent market design applications such as cadet-branch matching (Sönmez 2011, Sönmez and Switzer 2011 ).”
- (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice (2017, background): “See Pathak (2011) and Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2013) for surveys of the literature.”