Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts
By Bettina Klaus, Markus Walzl. 2006
109 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Computational Theory and Mathematics, Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/274219def16c5aafb3ad8ffc5b16d5e62ffd713a
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Computational Theory and Mathematics
In Economics and Econometrics
- Alexander Westkamp
- Scott Duke Kominers
- John William Hatfield
- Alexandru Nichifor
- Michael Ostrovsky
- Tayfun Sönmez
- T. Switzer
- Kazuo Murota
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Alexander Westkamp
- Scott Duke Kominers
- John William Hatfield
- Alexandru Nichifor
- Michael Ostrovsky
- Tayfun Sönmez
- T. Switzer
- Kazuo Murota
Citations in the corpus
- Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts (2012, unknown): “Furthermore, chain stability is not equivalent to the standard notions of stability used in the many-to-many matching literature, which are special cases of our stability notion (see Echenique and Oviedo (2006); Klaus and Walzl (2009); Hatfield and Kominers (2010)).”
- Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Trading Networks (2013, methodology): “We then consider the notion of strong group stability and show that in our setting, in contrast to the results of Echenique and Oviedo (2006) and Klaus and Walzl (2009) for matching settings without transfers, the set of stable outcomes coincides with the set of strongly group stable outcomes.”