Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing Mechanism? The Dynamics of Compensation Peer Benchmarking

By Michael W. Faulkender, Jun Yang. 2013

128 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b886d05846118f07741ac118e7763b2a7652c40a

Citations in the corpus

• CEO Pay and Firm Size: an Update after the Crisis (2013, unknown): “They also required the disclosure of peers used for benchmarking compensation, another key driver of pay levels (Faulkender and Yang, 2013; Albuquerque et al., forth; and Bizjak et al., 2011).”
• Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “This chapter builds on and signi…cantly expands three earlier surveys on executive pay (co-)written by the authors: Frydman and Jenter (2010), which focuses on empirics, and Edmans and Gabaix (2009, 2016), which focus on theories.”
• Peer Choice in CEO Compensation (2012, unknown): “A recent study by Faulkender and Yang (2012) investigates a similar issue and argues that peer manipulation for benchmarking purposes has become more severe over time.”