CEO Pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect
By Rachel M. Hayes, Scott Schaefer. 2009
124 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/53d4ca379d9e94de33569a0e6194962b0a35b3b7
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Michael W. Faulkender
- Jun Yang
- Scott Schaefer
- Paul D. Oyer
- Jarrad Harford
- Xavier Gabaix
- Alex Edmans
- Murillo Campello
In Finance
- Michael W. Faulkender
- Jun Yang
- Paul D. Oyer
- Scott Schaefer
- Jarrad Harford
- Murillo Campello
- Till M. von Wachter
- Malcolm P. Baker
Citations in the corpus
- Inside the black box: The role and composition of compensation peer groups (2010, background): “In addition, Hayes and Schaefer (2009) offer a model of the ‘‘Lake Wobegon effect’’ in which firms distort CEO pay upward in an attempt to affect market perceptions of firm value.”
- Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing Mechanism? The Dynamics of Compensation Peer Benchmarking (2013, unknown): “3 See, for example, Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen (2008).”
- Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives (2010, background): “Hayes and Schaefer (2009) further complicate the picture by offering a model in which CEO pay signals rents in the CEO-firm employment relationship.”