Designing Effective Contracts: Exploring the Influence of Framing and Expectations

By Libby Weber, Kyle J. Mayer. 2011

244 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0048da2a026fe844a4766a34bbbab49366d69822

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Citations in the corpus

National Animosity and Cross-Border Alliances (2013, background): “Conditions that increase the likelihood of opportunism and risks and lower trust in exchange relationships foster preventive contracts that emphasize safeguards instead of gain-framed contracts that foster flexibility and alignment of interests (Weber & Mayer, 2011).”
A Review of Multilevel Regulatory Focus in Organizations (2015, background): “Weber and Mayer (2011) also integrate RFT into effective contract design, arguing that both transaction cost economics and relational views of governance regard contracts as a means to deter opportunism in exchanges; as such, both approaches implicitly take a prevention-focused viewpoint with…”
Regulatory focus as a psychological micro-foundation of leaders' exploration and exploitation activities (2015, background): “…in the psychology literature during the last two decades, and has recently attracted attention in leading strategic management journals (e.g., Das & Kumar, 2011; McMullen, Shepherd, & Patzelt, 2009; Stam, van Knippenberg, & Wisse, 2010; Wanberg, Zhu, Kanfer, & Zhang, 2012; Weber & Mayer, 2011).”
Toward a unified theory of project governance: economic, sociological and psychological supports for relational contracting (2012, background): “For a related consideration of the impact of framing on governance that focuses onprevention versus promotion frames and expectancy violation see Weber and Mayer (2011).”
Alliance Capabilities (2015, background): “…with preventing opportunistic behaviors tend to frame contractual clauses in a manner that punishes such behaviors, while firms concerned more with promoting mutually beneficial relationships design contracts in a manner that rewards cooperative behaviors (Weber et al., 2011; Weber & Mayer, 2011).”