Harley E. Ryan
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · 2001–2004
A researcher in the Science corpus: 4 papers; trusts 1 researcher and is trusted by 5 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.
Whom Harley E. Ryan trusts overall
Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.
Who trusts Harley E. Ryan overall
- Neslihan Ozkan
- Ellen Engel
- Rachel M. Hayes
- Jeffrey L. Coles
- Shawn Mobbs
- Ronald W. Masulis
- P. Brockman
- Ginka Borisova
- Scott F. Latham
- Xue Wang
Papers from Harley E. Ryan's perspective
Ordered by how strongly the researchers Harley E. Ryan trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.
- Incentive Compensation for Outside Directors and CEO Turnover
- The Cadbury Committee, Corporate Performance, and Top Management Turnover
- CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and Firm Performance: Evidence of Cronyism
- Sample selection bias as a specification error
- Investment bank market share, contingent fee payments, and the performance of acquiring firms
- Do Takeover Targets Underperform? Evidence from Operating and Stock Returns (Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis)
- An Almost Ideal Demand System
- Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey
- Explaining the Diversification Discount
- VARIETIES OF SELECTION BIAS
Their papers
- Who is in whose pocket? Director compensation, board independence, and barriers to effective monitoring (2004) — 644 citations
- Financial Advisors and Shareholder Wealth Gains in Corporate Takeovers (2003) — 226 citations
- The Interactions Between R&D Investment Decisions and Compensation Policy (2002) — 220 citations
- The influence of firm- and manager-specific characteristics on the structure of executive compensation (2001) — 268 citations