Do Takeover Targets Underperform? Evidence from Operating and Stock Returns

By Anup Agrawal, J. Jaffe. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2003

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What drives merger waves (2005, background): “Some authors, such as Shleifer and Vishny (2003), argue that the neoclassical hypothesis is lacking because it predicts performance improvements following a merger and the extant evidence on this is mixed at best (see Agrawal and Jaffe, 2003, for a review of the evidence).”
Takeover Contests with Asymmetric Bidders (2006, unknown): “Bidder 2 would now decline the offer if s2 tþ " j and accept it 26 For an overview, see Agrawal and Jaffe (2003).”
Financial Advisors and Shareholder Wealth Gains in Corporate Takeovers (2003, background): “Additionally, see Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) for evidence related to the pre-takeover performance of target firms.”
Stakeholder Rights and Corporate Governance: A Cross-National Study of Hostile Takeovers (2004, unknown): “This explanation for takeover activity has also received longstanding attention within the financial economics literature under the rubric of the inefficient management hypothesis (Barber, Palmer, and Wallace, 1995; Agrawal and Jaffe, 2003).”