CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and Firm Performance: Evidence of Cronyism

By Ivan E. Brick, Oded Palmon, John K. Wald. 2006

908 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/be0c707af8f4a4557e93475bc4b3184c5f1b3398

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Citations in the corpus

Firm performance, corporate governance and executive compensation in Pakistan (2018, background): “Empirically, most of the studies (e.g. Boyd 1994; Brick, Palmon, and Wald 2006; Conyon and He 2012; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 1999; Fahlenbrach 2009; Van Essen, Otten, and Carberry 2012b) find positive association between CEO duality and executive compensation, indicating the likelihood of CEO…”
The Impact of Corporate Governance on Firm Performance During The COVID-19 Pandemic: Evidence from Malaysia (2021, neutral): “This argument is supported by Brick et al. (2006) who found a significant association between the number of meetings and director compensation.”
Within-industry timing of earnings warnings: do managers herd? (2010, background): “Managers and their evaluators may be linked by interlocking directorships (Brick et al. 2006) and social ties (Hwang and Kim 2008).”
Cronyism: a cross-cultural analysis (2006, background): “In a Western context, Brick et al. (2002) found support for their ‘cronyism hypothesis’ that ‘excessive compensation’ of CEOs and their board members predicts subsequent low performance by their companies.”
Board Composition and Firm Performance: Evidence from Bangladesh (2010, neutral): “Studies for example by Kaplan and Reishus (1990), Byrd and Hickman (1992), Brickley et al. (1994), and Beasley (1996) found a positive impact from appointing outside independent directors onto the board.”
Additions to corporate boards: the effect of gender (2005, positive): “This procedure was adopted by Brick et al. (2002) to measure directors’ option values. Because this is a crude proxy we also use different measures of option value (0%, 50%, 75%, and 100% of exercise price) as robustness checks. Compensation is deflated by the CPI and entered in log form. We use pre”
Corporate Governance and Firm-Specific Stock Price Crashes (2016, neutral): “This result suggests that outside directors with equity ownership may encourage myopic behavior [see for example Brick et al. (2006)].”
Does Corporate Governance Influence Earnings Management in Latin American Markets? (2014, background): “(2011) in Brazil, find that if the size of the Board is very small, the monitoring of the management team is smaller too, so they tend towards greater discretion in receiving higher remuneration, a greater chance of EM and are more prone to information asymmetry (Fernandez 1998; Azofra et al. 2005; ”