Tilman Börgers
Management Science and Operations Research · 1997–2015
A researcher in the Science corpus: 4 papers; trusts 5 researchers and is trusted by 2 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.
Subfields
- Management Science and Operations Research — 13 citations into it
- Marketing — 7 citations into it
- Economics and Econometrics — 6 citations into it
Whom Tilman Börgers trusts overall
Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.
- Albert Benveniste
- Alvin E. Roth
- Benjamin L. Edelman
- Ido Erev
- Paul R. Milgrom
- Roger B. Myerson
- Efe A. Ok
- Michael Ostrovsky
- Pierre Priouret
- Rajiv Sarin
Who trusts Tilman Börgers overall
- Karl Tuyls
- Brian Skyrms
- Robert Sugden
- Nir Vulkan
- Daan Bloembergen
- Ann Nowé
- Drew Fudenberg
- David S. Leslie
- Cosma Rohilla Shalizi
- Liane Gabora
Papers from Tilman Börgers's perspective
Ordered by how strongly the researchers Tilman Börgers trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.
- Optimal Auction Design
- Adaptive Algorithms and Stochastic Approximations
- Putting Auction Theory to Work
- Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria
- Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation
- Optimization by Vector Space Methods
- Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly (Journal of Economics Theory)
- Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term*
- Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics
- Position Auctions with Consumer Search
Their papers
- An introduction to the theory of mechanism design (2015) — 379 citations
- Equilibrium Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions: Theory and Evidence (2013) — 116 citations
- Naive Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspirations (2000) — 187 citations
- Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics (1997)