Equilibrium Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions: Theory and Evidence

By Tilman Börgers, Ingemar Johansson Cox, Martin Pesendorfer, Vaclav Petricek. 2013

116 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ff7158f5905c2ddc133ce43160d152889f89865a

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Ilya Segal
2. Przemyslaw Jeziorski

In Marketing

1. Benjamin Edelman
2. Ilya Segal
3. Przemyslaw Jeziorski

In Strategy and Management

1. Benjamin Edelman
2. Ilya Segal
3. Przemyslaw Jeziorski

Citations in the corpus

• Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions (2010, background): “Thompson and LeytonBrown (2009) computationally explore the set of all equilibria in complete information GSP. Borgers et al. (2007) consider various Nash equilibria of the complete information game and suggest that a profit-maximizing search engine should be able to coordinate bidders on a equilibr”
• An Empirical Analysis of Search Engine Advertising: Sponsored Search in Electronic Markets (2009, unknown): “The recent work by Borgers et al. (2007) that incorporates non-uniform values for clicks in their theoretical model is a step in this direction.”