Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation

By J. Laffont, David Martimort. 2000

340 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bcd9585f4aa4ea1a3065ae149cbc8bf0f16382bd

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In Economics and Econometrics

In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information (2003, background): “…is thus solution to the following problem: max {φτj (·),uij} p(θ1|τj)v(s(φτj(θ1)) + t(φτj(θ1))− θ1q(φτj(θ1))− u1j) +p(θ2|τj)v(s(φτj(θ2)) + t(φτj(θ2))− θ2q(φτj(θ2))− u2j) 23See Laffont and Martimort (1997, 2000) for a similar use of passive beliefs and below for further remarks on the case of…”
The Organization of Supplier Networks: Effects of Delegation and Intermediation (2004, background): “Therefore the participation constraint (17) is equivalent to û2(θ̄2) ≥ 0.”
On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design (2006, background): “More recently, Laffont and Martimort (2000) have established the continuity of the mechanism’s outcome function also for environments with risk-neutral agents who are not constrained by limited liability, but who may form collusive coalitions.”
An introduction to the theory of mechanism design (2015, background): “Laffont and Martimort (2000) have shown that in environments in which types are close to independent collusion might prevent the mechanism designer from full surplus extraction.”
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions (2006, background): “Laffont and Martimort [22] introduce collusion proofness as an additional constraint on the design of mechanisms for public good problems.7 The model and some preliminary results are presented in the next section.”