Position Auctions with Consumer Search
By Susan Athey, Glenn Ellison. 2007
499 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ccc782afb87b5127675cef00544906541a8d9de8
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Ran Spiegler
- Kfir Eliaz
- Mark Armstrong
- Ingemar Johansson Cox
- Vaclav Petricek
- Tilman Börgers
- Hal R. Varian
- Ilya Segal
In Marketing
- Mark Armstrong
- Ingemar Johansson Cox
- Vaclav Petricek
- Kfir Eliaz
- Tilman Börgers
- Hal R. Varian
- Ilya Segal
- Ran Spiegler
In Strategy and Management
- Mark Armstrong
- Ingemar Johansson Cox
- Vaclav Petricek
- Kfir Eliaz
- Tilman Börgers
- Hal R. Varian
- Ilya Segal
- Ran Spiegler
Citations in the corpus
- Equilibrium Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions: Theory and Evidence (2013, background): “Indeed, Overture, which had started as an independent company, had been acquired at this point by Yahoo, and it was later to be renamed Yahoo Search Marketing.”
- Understanding the paradigm shift to computational social science in the presence of big data (2014, unknown): “Forexample,generalizedsecondprice position auctions have recently been identi fi ed as not being equivalent to the Vickrey – Clarke – Groves mechanism in the keyword auction context [6,40].”
- What Makes Them Click: Empirical Analysis of Consumer Demand for Search Advertising (2012, background): “Athey and Ellison (2011) (henceforth AE) model user learning about general ad relevance in the course of a search session: upon learning the relevance of a clicked ad, the user updates his receiving impression A with probability x 100+x and no ads at all with the complementary probability.”
- What is Different About Online Advertising? (2014, unknown): “This literature has been extended to incorporate reserveprices (EdelmanandSchwarz2010), clickweights (Liu and Chen 2006), and the incorporation of consumer choices into the model (Athey and Ellison 2009; Chen and He 2011).”
- Paying for Prominence (2011, background): “…pricing decision, and the rm with the highest q is willing to pay the most to be prominent, and that is also the rm which consumers would most like to investigate rst. Similar e¤ects are also seen in models of sponsored-link auctions, as studied by Athey and Ellison (2011) and Chen and He (2006).”
- Online advertising and privacy (2014, unknown): “Athey and Gans (2010), Bergemann and Bonatti (2011) and Athey, Calvano, and Gans (2012) study how targeting affects advertising markets and competition between online and offline media.”
- Computer Mediated Transactions (2010, background): “See, for example, Athey and Ellison (2007), Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwartz (2007), Varian (2007), and Varian (2009).”
- Consideration Sets and Competitive Marketing (2006, background): “Therefore, if a rm deviates from M to the menu X, it increases its market share by at least 1 2 (1)+ 1 2 (1 (1)) = 12 , which by assumption is strictly higher than the added menu cost c(X) c(M ).”