Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly

By Alejandro M. Manelli, Daniel R. Vincent. Journal of Economics Theory, 2007

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Bayesian and Dominant‐Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private‐Values Model (2010, background): “We provide a direct proof for completeness, and because the results in Manelli and Vincent (2007) are expressed in terms of interim utilities in multiunit environments.”
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing (2010, background): “, where each agent ’s preference is given by multiple values for each of the multip le services available) [24].”
An introduction to the theory of mechanism design (2015, background): “2 is a modified version of Manelli and Vincent (2007). The theory of non-linear pricing in Section 2.”
Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods (2011, methodology): “22 This result was also derived in Manelli and Vincent (2007) using a different technique. c,+∞):(iii) When c ∈ [ (β (θ2),t(θ2)) = (1, 4 3 c+ 2 3 √ c 2+ 3 2 ) for every θ2 ∈ [c,c+1] When c = 0, the optimal mechanism is deterministic: the buyer can either get any one good at the price 2 33 or get…”