A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control.

By Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine. The American Economic Review, 2006

1,145 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We propose that a simple "dual-self" model gives a unified explanation for several empirical regularities, including the apparent time inconsistency that has motivated models of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and Rabin’s paradox of risk aversion in the large and small. The model also implies that self-control costs imply excess delay, as in the O'Donoghue and Rabin models of quasi-hyperbolic utility, and it explains experimental evidence that increased cognitive load makes temptations harder to resist. The base version of our model is consistent with the Gul-Pesendorfer axioms, but we argue that these axioms must be relaxed to account for the effect of cognitive load.

Subfields: Clinical Psychology, Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d27cfeb0fde452d7d3e434df8e609e2451c81a51

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Citations in the corpus

Behavioral Economics: Past, Present and Future (2016, positive): “Schelling ( 1984 ) and Fudenberg and Levine ( 2006 ) also proposed two-self models to characterize this behavior.”
Timing and Self-Control (2012, methodology): “Fudenberg and Levine (2006) defined a SR-perfect Nash equilibrium profile to be equivalent to a solution to the reduced form optimization problem of maximizing Ea Y1 ∞∑ k=0 δk(u(Yk 0 a)−C(Yk a)) if the reduced strategy induced from the shorter-run players’ strategy profile is a solution to the…”
The Long Run Impact of Bombing Vietnam (2006, positive): “Someone may not trust their future self, for reasons elaborated in a series of papers on hyperbolic preferences, temptation models or dual-self models (Laibson 1997; Gul and Pesendorfer 2004; Fudenberg and Levine 2005, respectively).”
Access to Finance (2010, neutral): “, 2001; Laibson, 1997; O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999), theories of temptation (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001 and 2004), or dual-self models of self control (Fudenberg and Levine, 2005) to generate this prediction.”
Temptation-Driven Preferences (2009, neutral): “See also the related criticism of independence in Fudenberg and Levine (2005).”
Optimizing agent behavior over long time scales by transporting value (2018, methodology): “(3) is only appropriate for the simplest of tasks, because, though its expectation is the episodic policy gradient, it is a stochastic estimate with high variance.”