Aleksandar Sasa Pekec

Marketing · 2003–2004

A researcher in the Science corpus: 2 papers; trusts 1 researcher and is trusted by 0 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

Whom Aleksandar Sasa Pekec trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

  1. Noam Nisan
  2. Lawrence M. Ausubel
  3. Sushil Bikhchandani
  4. Sven de Vries

Who trusts Aleksandar Sasa Pekec overall

  1. John William Hatfield
  2. Margaretha Gansterer

Papers from Aleksandar Sasa Pekec's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers Aleksandar Sasa Pekec trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

  1. Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
  2. Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions (ACM Conference on Economics and Computation)
  3. The Package Assignment Model (Journal of Economics Theory)
  4. Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey (INFORMS journal on computing)
  5. Random utility models in marketing research: a survey
  6. Optimal Auction Design
  7. Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling (Games Econ. Behav.)
  8. Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
  9. Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms (ACM Conference on Economics and Computation)
  10. Integer programming for combinatorial auction winner determination (Proceedings Fourth International Conference on MultiAgent Systems)

Their papers