E. Spiegelman

Economics and Econometrics · 2013–2020

A researcher in the Science corpus: 2 papers; trusts 11 researchers and is trusted by 0 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

Whom E. Spiegelman trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

  1. Navin Kartik
  2. Christoph Vanberg
  3. Martin A. Dufwenberg
  4. Pierpaolo Battigalli
  5. Jordi Brandts
  6. Sjaak Hurkens

Papers from E. Spiegelman's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers E. Spiegelman trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

  1. Guilt in Games
  2. Promises, Threats and Fairness
  3. Dynamic psychological games (Journal of Economics Theory)
  4. WHY DO PEOPLE KEEP THEIR PROMISES? AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF TWO EXPLANATIONS
  5. Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game (Games Econ. Behav.)
  6. Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
  7. Enjoy the silence: an experiment on truth-telling
  8. Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion
  9. The grammar of society: the nature and dynamics of social norms
  10. Let's Get Personal: An International Examination of the Influence of Communication, Culture and Social Distance on Other Regarding Preferences

Their papers