Strategic Communication with Lying Costs

By Navin Kartik. 2009

584 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/edff801595c572b2118df09a6a1efbf54dcb2f75

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In Management Science and Operations Research

In Safety Research

Citations in the corpus

The Credit Ratings Game (2012, unknown): “nite horizon in the CRA literature; indeed there are very few such models in the industrial organization literature for obvious reasons of tractability.(28)”
Managers Set the Tone: Equity Incentives and the Tone of Earnings Press Releases (2016, unknown): “Motivated by the AlmostCheap Talk model of Kartik (2009), we analyze the firm’s abnormal returns to study whether investors anticipate the higher likelihood of tone inflation in the presence of strong equity incentives.”
Preferences for Truth‐Telling (2016, background): “This intuition is also present in Khalmetski and Sliwka (2016) and Frankel and Kartik (2016). We then turn to calibrating a simple version of our model, showing that it can match all the stylized facts we uncovered in the meta study and the patterns in our new experiments.”
Bare promises: An experiment (2010, background): “Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland (1994), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Sutter (2009), and Vanberg (2008).”
Disguising Lies—Image Concerns and Partial Lying in Cheating Games (2019, background): “…is worth noting that such games also capture structural properties of many real-life communication settings where: 1) transmitted information is not easily veri able (or veri - 2Models of belief-independent costs of lying were developed by Kartik, Ottaviani and Squintani (2007) and Kartik (2009).”
Self-confidence and strategic behavior (2017, unknown): “An example at theworkplace that ð1Þ 8 Kartik (2009) also analyzes a sender-receiver game with lying costs.”
Representative evidence on lying costs (2014, methodology): “For example, Kartik (2009) and Kartik et al. (2007) build on Crawford and Sobel's (1982) cheap-talk model and derive predictions for the case that some agents incur costs when misreporting their private information (see also, e.g., Saran, 2011; Kartik et al., 2014).”
When Does Communication Improve Coordination (2010, background): “See Navin Kartik (2008) and the references therein for analyses of strategic information transmission with positive lying costs.”
Why do people tell the truth? Experimental evidence for pure lie aversion (2013, background): “Our study contributes to a burgeoning experimental literature examining deception and honesty—e.g., Gneezy (2005), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Vanberg (2008), Hurkens and Kartik (2009), Sutter (2009).”