Promises, Threats and Fairness
By Tore Ellingsen, Magnus Johannesson. 2004
443 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/acb69e6955f82375e29c880f3489e58ac89ec360
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Ernst Fehr
- Klaus M. Schmidt
- Gary Charness
- Urs Fischbacher
- Christoph Vanberg
- Magnus Johannesson
- Tore Ellingsen
- Martin A. Dufwenberg
In Safety Research
- Ernst Fehr
- Klaus M. Schmidt
- Gary Charness
- Urs Fischbacher
- Magnus Johannesson
- Tore Ellingsen
- Johannes Abeler
- Martin A. Dufwenberg
In Sociology and Political Science
- Klaus M. Schmidt
- Ernst Fehr
- Urs Fischbacher
- Gary Charness
- Christoph Vanberg
- Magnus Johannesson
- Tore Ellingsen
- James Andreoni
Citations in the corpus
- Gender differences in deception (2008, background): “It has been demonstrated in numerous experiments that anonymous pre-play communication increases cooperation in social dilemmas and improves bargaining efficiency (Sally, 1995; Camerer, 2003; Valley et al., 2002; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004).”
- Lies in Disguise. An experimental study on cheating (2013, background): “Still, it is more plausible to let them roll the die in order to determine a payoff for doing something instead of just letting them roll the die and paying them without any explanation.”
- The power of asking: How communication affects selfishness, empathy, and altruism (2011, background): “This “paradox of obviousness,” which has been studied in other contexts (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Charness and Rabin, 2005; Charness, 2000; Xiao and Houser, 2009), must be understood from two different perspectives.”
- WHY DO PEOPLE KEEP THEIR PROMISES? AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF TWO EXPLANATIONS (2008, methodology): “…especially the exchange of promises, has profound effects on subsequent levels of cooperation in experimental games (Bicchieri and Lev-On (2007), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004), Kerr and Kaufmann-Gilliland (1994), Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992), Sally (1995)).”
- The Aversion to Lying (2009, background): “Both Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) and Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) found strong effects of promises when promises were part of free-form communication, whereas Holm and Danielson (2005) found no significant effects of pre-fabricated promises.”
- Enjoy the silence: an experiment on truth-telling (2009, background): “We do not want to dismiss either other operationalizations of the concept of lying aversion; namely Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) one based on expectations in the context of giving and keeping promises (see also Ellingsen and Johannesson 2005 ).”
- Anticipated verbal feedback induces altruistic behavior (2008, methodology): “The significance level for the bootstrap test was based on 5,099 bootstrap replications; see Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) for a further discussion of this test.”
- Preference Elicitation under Oath (2010, unknown): “Moreover, those people who made promises in the communication phase are found to be likely to keep them when playing in both a hold-up game (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004) and in trust games (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006).”
- Chapter 8 The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories (2006, background): “More recently, Engelmann and Strobel (2004) argued that “efficiency” is an important motive that clearly dominates the desire for equality in 3 player dictator games.”
- Bare promises: An experiment (2010, background): “Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) were probably first to model this, via a “personal cost of being inconsistent,” and Chen et al. (2008) and Kartik (2009) develop theory around the more general notion that decision-makers have a (belief-independent) cost-of-lying.”
- Preferences for Truth‐Telling (2016, background): “Other influential experiments in this literature are, e.g., Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) and Vanberg (2008).”
- The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism--Experimental Evidence and New Theories. (2005, background): “More recently, Engelmann and Strobel (2004) argued that “efficiency” is an important motive that clearly dominates the desire for equality in 3 player dictator games.”
- Why do people tell the truth? Experimental evidence for pure lie aversion (2013, background): “1Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) and Gneezy (2005) review some psychological literature on lie aversion.”
- When Does Communication Improve Coordination (2010, background): “honestly (e.g., Ellingsen and Johannesson 2004b and the references therein), and our results would be largely the same with positive utility from honesty.”