Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game

By Martin A. Dufwenberg, Uri Gneezy. Games Econ. Behav., 2000

495 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3596f06a857716d3d0b8c10ba59a600c82a54226

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

In General Decision Sciences

In Safety Research

Citations in the corpus

Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation (2002, unknown): “For example, Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) and Jacobsen and Sadrieh (1996) find reciprocity in the “investment game”; McCabe, Rassenti and Smith (1996) in an extensive form game; Bolle (1998) in trust games; van der Heijden, Nelissen, Potters and Verbon (2001) in a gift exchange game; Clark and S”
Development of Trust and Reciprocity in Adolescence. (2010, background): “Typical findings in the Trust Game are that adults often choose to trust and reciprocate, even when doing so is potentially costly (Berg et al., 1995; Bolle, 1995; Dufwenberg & Gneezy, 2000; Ortmann, Fitzgerald, & Boeing, 2000; McCabe, Houser, Ryan, Smith, & Trouard, 2001).”
Promises and Partnership (2006, unknown): “Dufwenberg and Gneezy ( 2000 ) and Bacharach , Guerra , and Zizzo ( 2001 ) collect data on second - order beliefs and test a related hypothesis , but do not examine communication .”
Testing theories of fairness - Intentions matter (2008, background): “While we have not done this in this study, other studies have used the measurement of higher order beliefs to test theories based on psychological game theory (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2003).”
Great expectations: neural computations underlying the use of social norms in decision-making. (2011, result): “To demonstrate the importance of considering expectations in the UG, we compared a novel expectation model, which incorporates expectations to the standard inequity-aversion model, which posits that people are motivated to minimize the difference between their payoffs.”
Why do people tell the truth? Experimental evidence for pure lie aversion (2013, background): “Beliefs can interact with consequences, as in the idea, first tested in Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), that people feel bad if they believe that their choice will result in others’ not receiving the payoff that they expected.”
The power of asking: How communication affects selfishness, empathy, and altruism (2011, background): “This explanation is consistent with previous findings of guilt aversion (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006).”
Identification of Social Interactions (2011, unknown): “For instance, Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) consider a variant on the game of figure 1 where trustees can make any division of 20 (rather than 30) should they get the move, and trustors can choose to play In or Out, and receive x, which is varied across treatments.”
The effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public goods experiments (2010, methodology): “We used the experimental software z-Tree developed by Fischbacher (1999). We had three treatments in two of which we elicited beliefs about the other group members’ average contribution.”
Preference Elicitation under Oath (2010, unknown): “Second, an alternative explanation is guilt aversion, which is experienced by one who fails to meet the expectations of others (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007).”