Umut Öneş
Safety Research · 2007
A researcher in the Science corpus: 1 paper; trusts 7 researchers and is trusted by 4 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.
Subfields
- Safety Research — 18 citations into it; #2,835 of 5,829 by trust here, #3,668 by citations
- Sociology and Political Science — 11 citations into it; #11,700 of 22,756 by trust here, #14,364 by citations
- Economics and Econometrics — 5 citations into it
Whom Umut Öneş trusts overall
Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.
- Ernst Fehr
- Simon Gächter
- Herbert Gintis
- Robert Kurzban
- Joseph Henrich
- Louis Putterman
- Daniel Houser
- Talbot Page
- Urs Fischbacher
- Armin Falk
Who trusts Umut Öneş overall
Papers from Umut Öneş's perspective
Ordered by how strongly the researchers Umut Öneş trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.
- Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments (Social Science Research Network)
- Why people punish defectors. Weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas. (Journal of Theoretical Biology)
- Strong reciprocity and human sociality. (Journal of Theoretical Biology)
- Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity (Social Science Research Network)
- Reciprocity in a two-part dictator game
- ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
- Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment
- Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model
- Individual differences in cooperation in a circular public goods game
- A theory of reciprocity (Games Econ. Behav.)