Strong reciprocity and human sociality.

By Herbert Gintis. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2000

1,136 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/08bf557380b18b08fd34898e3d16b5d133e9a4a6

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Citations in the corpus

Sixteen common misconceptions about the evolution of cooperation in humans (2011, background): “One example is the various strong reciprocity theoretical models where it is argued that kin selection is not important (e.g., Bowles & Gintis, 2004; Gintis, 2000), but then limited dispersal is assumed of a form that can lead to a substantial relatedness between interacting individuals (Lehmann et ”
Local Enforcement and Better Forests (2005, background): “One can think of the vigorous gossipers in a group as a kind of intolerant enforcer (Gintis, 2000).”
An eye-like painting enhances the expectation of a good reputation. (2011, background): “The other explanation, strong reciprocity theory, argues that people “tend to behave prosocially and punish antisocial behavior at cost to themselves even when the probability of future interactions is low or zero” (Gintis, 2000).”
Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms (2004, background): “Strong reciprocity (Gintis (2000), asserts that people punish free riders without much regard to the cost of punishment to enforce pro-social cooperation norms. This means the strong reciprocators punish rule breakers, but only within their groups. Social reciprocity, developed first in .Carpenter a”
Runaway Social Selection for Displays of Partner Value and Altruism (2007, background): “In behavioral economics laboratory experiments and in everyday life, people tend to be more altruistic than predicted (Gintis 2000; Fehr and Rockenbach 2004; Brown and Brown 2006; de Waal et al. 2006).”
Game Theory of Mind (2008, background): “It is possible that prosocial utility might produce apparently irrational behaviour, in an experimental setting, if it is ignored: Gintis [33] reviews the evidence for empirically identifiable forms of prosocial behaviour in humans, (strong reciprocity), that may in part explain human sociality.”
The Evolution of Tag-Based Cooperation in Humans (2012, background): “…and to punish those who do not help others) has been presented as a novel evolutionary mechanism that explains cooperation among nonrelatives in the absence of reputational consequences and/or opportunities for repeated interaction (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Gintis 2000; Gintis et al. 2003).”
Hand of God, Mind of Man: Punishment and Cognition in the Evolution of Cooperation* (2006, background): “A number of scholars have invoked group selection as a possible explanation (Boyd et al. 2003; Gintis 2000).”
Costly signaling and cooperation. (2001, background): “…(Dugatkin, 1997; Pusey & Packer, 1997), including mutualism (Brown, 1983; Connor, 1995), indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000; Leimar & Hammerstein , 2001), and multilevel selection (Wilson, 1977; Bowles, 2001; Sober & Wilson; 1998; Gintis, 2000b).”
Reputation Formation and the Evolution of Cooperation in Anonymous Online Markets (2014, positive): “Here we argue that other-regarding preferences, such as altruism (Becker 1976) and strong reciprocity (Gintis 2000), play an important role in maintaining the provision of feedback in anonymous online markets.”
Strong Reciprocity and the Roots of Human Morality (2008, background): “These are hardly conditions under which reciprocal altruism could be expected to flourish (Gintis, 2000).”
The Ecology of Collective Action: A Public Goods and Sanctions Experiment with Controlled Group Formation (2007, background): “…a > f > d > e. 7 Examples include Boyd and Richerson, 2002, Henrich and Boyd, 2001, Cosmides and Tooby, 1989, Rabin, 1993, Sethi and Somanathan, 2003, Gintis 2000, Guttman, 2000, Guttman, 2003, McCabe, Rassenti and Smith, 1996, Fehr and Gächter, 2002b, and Ben-Ner and Putterman (2002).”
Reputation is valuable within and outside one’s own social group (2005, background): “…and theoretical studies have identified reputation building (Milinski et al. 2002a), punishment (Boyd and Richerson 1992; Fehr and G chter 2000; Gintis 2000), even altruistic punishment (Fehr and G chter 2002) and volunteering (Hauert et al. 2002; Semmann et al. 2003) as mechanisms that can…”
Monetary sacrifice among strangers is mediated by endogenous oxytocin release after physical contact (2008, background): “…reciprocity, another multilevel selection theory, predicts that people share with reciprocators and punish defectors even in one-shot settings (Gintis, 2000; Bowles & Gintis, 2004), but whether this theory offers a new explanation for these behaviors is not uncontroversial (Burnham, &…”
When in Rome: conformity and the provision of public goods (2004, background): “In fact, Houser and Kurzban 252 (2002) have recently shown that confusion accounts for more behavior in the VCM, than 253 was previously thought.”
Disadvantage and prosocial behavior: the effects of the Wenchuan earthquake (2011, background): “This pattern is often called strong reciprocity (Gintis, 2000; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003).”