Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model

By Gary Charness, Matthew Rabin. 2000

182 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7e927e26c47a82f361c19e38ea5fa4f7e34f4203

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Citations in the corpus

Testing theories of fairness - Intentions matter (2008, background): “This has led to the development of several fairness models (Rabin 1993; Levine 1998; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 1999; Falk and Fischbacher 1999; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Charness and Rabin 2000).”
A stress test of fairness measures in models of social utility (2005, background): “Charness and Rabin (1999) distinguish negative reciprocity games, games where other-regarding behavior has a punishment flavor to it (such as ultimatum and other bargaining games), from positive reciprocity games, games where other-regarding behavior has a reward flavor to it (such as dictator and…”
Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness (2001, unknown): “In each session we had 20-24 subjects, half of them principals ("employers'') the other half agents ("employees'').”
“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies (2005, background): “The importance of wealth for PGG games, but not for UG, is consistent with predictions from the context specific approach, assuming that the resemblance of the public goods game to 55 the familiar harambee cues appropriate behavior in that game but does not generalize to the uncued.”
Let's Get Personal: An International Examination of the Influence of Communication, Culture and Social Distance on Other Regarding Preferences (2006, unknown): “…to distinguish these two types of models include Blount (1995), Bolton and Ockenfels (1998), Bolton et al. (2000), Bolton et al. (1998), Charness (2004), Charness and Ernan (2002), Charness and Rabin (2002), Cox (2004), Kagel and Wolfe (2001), Kritikos and Bolle (1999), and Offerman (2002).”
Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules (2002, background): “…other than own income in agents’ utility function, something commonly referred to as “fairness” considerations (see, e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Charness and Rabin 2000, and Fehr and Schmidt 1999, to cite a few of the more prominent attempts to organize the experimental data).25 Fairness…”
Trust in Children (2002, background): “(forthcoming), Charness et al. (2001). 8 The adult was a hypothetical player.”
Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms (2002, background): “…versus the future, how close one’s house is to work, and so forth.7 In recent years several theories of social preferences have been developed (Rabin 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 1999; Falk and Fischbacher 1999; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Charness and Rabin 2000).”
The norm of restaurant tipping (2003, background): “…behavior provide a further, real-life illustration of the behavioral power of these norms.4 Finally, our analysis in Section 5 is closely related to the recent literature on social preferences (see Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and Charness and Rabin (2002)).”
Identifying cooperative behavior: some experimental results in a prisoner's dilemma game (2002, background): “…(Brandts and Schram, 1996), different sorts of reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 1998; Falk and Fischbacher, 1998), " quasi-maximin preferences " (Charness and Rabin, 2000), and the combination of altruism with error effects (Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997; Anderson et al., 1998).”
Voluntary Participation and Spite in Public Good Provision Experiments: An International Comparison (2002, background): “The evidence seems clear that subjects in many situations do not seek simply to maximize monetary earnings, and several recent models have introduced non-monetary factors into players’ objective functions (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 1998; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, ”
Distributional concerns: equity- or efficiency-oriented? (2001, unknown): “7 This compares to 100% (with 36 participants) in the same kind of experiment in Charness and Rabin [2000] .”
Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games (2003, background): “For example, Rabin (1993), Falk and Fischbacher (1999), Segal and Sobel (1999) and Charness and Rabin (2000) posit that bargainers make attributions about the intentions of their partners when deciding how to act.”
Control Without Deception: Individual Behaviour in Free-Riding Experiments Revisited (2000, background): “19 See also Charness and Rabin (2000) for comparison, who find evidence that kind actions by first movers in (reduced strategy) gift exchange games can lead to enhanced selfishness in the latter player, compared to play in a control dictator game.”