Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions

By Vincent P. Crawford. 2003

424 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fa2dd5352e69068a26b465faccb261f1248bb291

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Citations in the corpus

Credulity, lies, and costly talk (2007, neutral): “In the literature, [8] is the first paper to analyze the impact of bounded rationality on communication outcomes.”
Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? (2007, methodology): “We use MW's (1982, Section 3) general model with interdependent values and affiliated signals, which includes independent private values, pure common values, and intermediate cases in which bidders observe affiliated private signals that are informative about their interdependent values.”
Coarse Thinking and Persuasion (2008, background): “Persuaders 5 Crawford (2003) presents a cheap talk model in which uncertainty surrounding the Sender’s type (e.g., whether or not he is strategic) may enable a strategic Sender to “fool” a sophisticated Receiver into taking a suboptimal action in equilibrium.”
Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games (2006, methodology): “Crawford (2003) studies a cheap talk model with a zero-sum underlying game in which players can be rational or the L0 and L1 types (i.e., truster and liar senders, believer and inverter receivers).”
Endogenous Depth of Reasoning (2016, neutral): “32) x = 80 L (48) R (52) x = 80 L (50) R (50) T (48) T (50) B (52) B (50) x = 320 L (16) R (84) x = 320 L (16) R (84) T (96) T (83) B (4) B (17) x = 44 L (80) R (20) x = 44 L (84) R (16) T (2) T (0) B (98) B (100)”
Strategic Communication with Lying Costs (2009, background): “9See Crawford (2003) for a similar conceptual framework in a game of pre-play communication.”
When Does Communication Improve Coordination (2010, background): “on the part of level-1; this is the essentially the approach taken by Crawford (2003) .”
Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study (2006, background): “Nagel’s and HCW’s data resemble neither “equilibrium plus noise” nor “equilibrium taking noise into account” as in quantal response equilibrium (“QRE”; Richard McKelvey and Thomas Palfrey, 1995).”
Imperfect Choice or Imperfect Attention? Understanding Strategic Thinking in Private Information Games (2014, neutral): “Compared to the previous betting game experiments, our games have two novel properties (besides " mousetracking " ): Nash theory predicts a mixture of betting and no-betting across the games (so there is a rich statistical variety of behaviour) and we consider 3-state games that are simpler than…”
Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games (2007, methodology): “…Wilson (1994, 1995) and Rosemarie Nagel (1995) and further developed by Teck-Hua Ho, Colin Camerer, and Keith Weigelt (1998), Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Bruno Broseta (2001), Crawford (2003), Camerer, Ho, and Juin Kuan Chong (2004), CostaGomes and Crawford (2006), and Crawford and Iriberri (2007).”
The Conjoint Influence of Top and Middle Management Characteristics on Management Innovation (2018, background): “1516 Journal of Management / April 2018 for the purposes of a specific study, as some have questioned the validity of corporate communications (e.g., Crawford, 2003).”
To Review or Not to Review? Limited Strategic Thinking at the Movie Box Office (2012, neutral): “This paper explores the generality of these approaches through the first empirical comparison of the CH and cursed equi- 1See Crawford (2003).”
Cognition and Renewal: Comparing CEO and Organizational Effects on Incumbent Adaptation to Technical Change (2009, background): “CEOs may not communicate their actual views to their shareholders, either because they are keeping the information secret or because they are dissembling to gain strategic advantage over rivals ( Crawford 2003 ).”