Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?

By Vincent P. Crawford, Nagore Iriberri. 2007

554 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d0c7ddf2d469aff6cbd42f94b2a45d531347c206

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In Management Science and Operations Research

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Citations in the corpus

Predicting human behavior in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games (2013, result): “This mixed result is consistent with earlier, less extensive comparisons of QRE with these two models (Chong et al., 2005; Crawford and Iriberri, 2007a; Rogers et al., 2009, see also Section 9), and suggests to us that, in answer to the question posed in Section 2.3, there may be value to modeling…”
The desire to win: The effects of competitive arousal on motivation and behavior (2010, background): “The mechanism underlying the winner’s curse is incomplete information and a tendency to ignore the perspectives and decisions of other parties (Bazerman & Samuelson, 1983; Crawford & Iriberri, 2007; Thaler, 1988).”
An Endowment Effect for Risk: Experimental Tests of Stochastic Reference Points (2015, background): “…in which behavior is organized around initial reactions to experimental environments ðCamerer, Ho, and Chong 2004; Costa-Gomes and Crawford 2006; Crawford and Iriberri 2007; Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Iriberri 2009Þ. 19 It may be more appropriate to apply PPE at the level of the experiment as…”
Behavioral Contract Theory (2014, background): “Crawford et al. (2009) begin studying optimal auction design with level-k bidders. Following Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) and Crawford and Iriberri (2007), their model distinguishes between bidders of different levels of strategic reasoning.”
The Identification Power of Equilibrium in Simple Games (2008, methodology): “Other strategic assumptions that can be used and that deliver qualitatively different results than BS’s interim rationalizability is the P-dominance concept introduced for auction setups by Dekel and Wolinsky (2003) and used more recently by Crawford and Iriberri (2007).”
Understanding Overbidding In Second Price Auctions: An Experimental Study (2008, background): “For example, Crawford and Iriberri (2006) show that level-k models can not explain overbidding in SPAs. (5)ACK's experiments are motivated by the theoretical analysis in Kim and Che (2004). (6)In contrast, ACK's results from the FPA experiments favor risk aversion, instead of spite, as an explanatio”
Levels of theory-of-mind reasoning in competitive games (2012, unknown): “E-mail: goodie@uga.edu Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. been applied to beauty contests (Ho, Camerer, & Weigelt, 1998), auctions (Crawford & Iriberri, 2007), and strategic lying (Crawford, 2003).”
Self-confidence and strategic behavior (2017, unknown): “…to the prevailing view that people 16 With the caveat that the data is not sufficiently rich to exclude that receivers discount signals to a small degree. have difficulty with higher-order reasoning, as discussed extensively in the literature on k-level thinking (e.g., Crawford and Iriberri 2007).”
To Review or Not to Review? Limited Strategic Thinking at the Movie Box Office (2012, unknown): “For example, in “hide-and-seek” games a natural starting point is to choose a “focal” strategy (see Crawford and Iriberri (2007a)).”
Information and beliefs in a repeated normal-form game (2012, unknown): “Row-Player Column-Player (1) Nash (2) L1 (3) Rawls (4) Nash (5) L1 (6) Rawls”
The power of asking: How communication affects selfishness, empathy, and altruism (2011, background): “Grossman (2010) revisits the Dana et al. (2007) game and replicates the finding that half of subjects remained ignorant when it was the default choice, but also finds that only 25% actively chose 13Great apes appear to have the capacity for level-1 mindreading only.”
Endogenous Depth of Reasoning (2016, background): “Level-k models have been extended to study communication (Crawford, 2003), incomplete information (Crawford and Iriberri, 2007) and other games.”