Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games

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To Review or Not to Review? Limited Strategic Thinking at the Movie Box Office (2012, unknown): “44Crawford and Iriberri (2007a, 2007b) estimate a level-k model for auctions and hide-and-seek games respectively.”
When Does Communication Improve Coordination (2010, methodology): “Crawford and Iriberri (2007b) use the level-k model to explain the winnerscurse and overbidding in private-value auctions and Crawford et al. (2009) use it to study optimal auction design.”
An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games (2011, unknown): “Note that, although similar findings have been documented previously in two-player zero-sum games (Brown and Rosenthal, 1990; Walker and Wooders, 2001; Camerer, 2003; Crawford and Iriberri, 2007), our study is novel in”
Predicting human behavior in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games (2013, background): “This mixed result is consistent with earlier, less extensive comparisons of QRE with these two models (Chong et al., 2005; Crawford and Iriberri, 2007a; Rogers et al., 2009, see also Section 9), and suggests to us that, in answer to the question posed in Section 2.3, there may be value to modeling…”